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ARCHAISTIC NAMES OF THE HIUNG-NU

by

OTTO MAENCHEN-HELFEN

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It is by now almost unanimously agreed that the equation Hun=Hiung-nu is phonetically unsound. Some scholars, still convinced that the Huns migrated *en masse* from the Chinese borderlands to the Volga, are therefore looking for other barbarians „weit in der Türkei“ to take the place formerly held by the Hiung-nu. Yet there are still partisans of the identification of the Hiung-nu with the Huns, and not only in the Soviet Union where they are stubbornly defending the old view.¹ Their most prominent representative in the West is Omeljan Pritsak. Conceding that no Latin, Greek, Syriac, or Armenian writer called the Huns by a name which resembles Hiung-nu, **χjung-no* in archaic Chinese, he turns to the Chinese annals in the hope, not to say expectation, of discovering in them a designation of the Hiung-nu which can be equated with Hun. He thinks he has found one.

„Der eigentliche Volksname der Hsiung-nu“, Pritsak writes,² „hat sich erhalten. Der Han-Kaiser Wu-ti (140–87 v. Chr.) gebrauchte ihn i. J. 119 v. Chr. beim Empfang des Besiegers der Hsiung-nu Ho Ch'ü-ping. Das Shih-chi schreibt diesen Namen als Hün-yü^{a,3} das Han-shu als Hün-yün^b. Somit ist auch hier das eigentliche Ethnikon nur der erste Teil des Namens, dessen archaische Aussprache (GS 458h:) **χiwān*, d. h. etwa **χun* gewesen ist.“

Like the other passages adduced by Pritsak in his article,⁴ the two to which he refers here have been translated before.⁵ But Pritsak is not

¹ Most recently L. N. Gumilev, „Nekotorye voprosy istorii gunnov“, *Vestnik drevnei istorii*, 1960, 4, pp. 120–125.

² „Xun, der Volksname der Hsiung-nu“, *CAJ*, V, 1 (1959), pp. 27–34.

³ The Chinese characters are given at the end of this article.

⁴ Although it was not germane to his purpose, Pritsak might have referred to the translations of the passages he adduced. I will quote the more easily accessible translations.

⁵ *Shih ki*, ch. III; J. J. M. de Groot, *Die Hunnen der vorchristlichen Zeit*, I (Berlin, 1921), p. 137; *ibid.* the parallel in *Han shu*, ch. 55.

content with going through translated texts in search of names; he looks up the Chinese characters and compares and contrasts their archaic pronunciation as given in Bernhard Karlgren's *Grammata Serica* (GS). That a turcologist should make such an effort deserves all respect. Yet besides the translated texts there are untranslated ones which in studies of this kind must not be ignored. Pritsak approaches the modern standardized versions of early texts as if the scribes were divinely inspired. This misunderstanding of Chinese textual tradition, the limitation to translated passages, and the many misreadings unfortunately invalidate the arguments of my learned friend.

The thesis that *-yü* and *-yün* in *Hün-yü* and *Hün-yün* are not parts of the names but epithets will be discussed later. However, even if they were, why should **χiwən* be the real name of the Hiung-nu, the one by which they called themselves? What prompted the Emperor to use it in a decree, while the annalists invariably speak of the Hiung-nu? Pritsak did not ask himself this question, and therefore did not suspect that *Hün-yü* and *Hün-yün* might, in this specific context, have a specific meaning. He overlooked that the passage in *Shih ki*, ch. 111, has three parallels in Han literature.

(1) In *Shih ki*, ch. 60, 15,⁶ the Hiung-nu are again called *Hün-yü*^a; they live in the North, men with the hearts of beasts, who maltreat their old people. This corresponds to the description of the Hiung-nu in *Shih ki*, ch. 110.⁷

(2) In an edict of Wang Mang the Hiung-nu are called *Hien-yun*^c.⁸

(3) In a decree issued in A. D. 85 the Hiung-nu are equated with the *Hien-yün*^c and *Hün-yü*^a of ancient times.⁹

There are two later, and very instructive, parallels which also escaped Pritsak's attention: the one in *Sui shu*, ch. 84, the other in *Kiu T'ang shu*, ch. 2.

(4) In A. D. 587, Ch'u-lo-hou, who called himself Ye-hu (Yabγu)¹⁰

⁶ The numbers in the references in the *Shih ki* chapters refer to the pages in *Shiki kaichū kōshō*^N

⁷ Pointed out by Ssu-ma Cheng.

⁸ *Han shu*, ch. 94b, transl. O. Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*, III (Berlin-Leipzig, 1937), pp. 180-181.

⁹ *Hou Han shu*, ch. 119, transl. Bichurin (Yakinf), *Sobranie svedenii o narodakh obitavshikh v srednei Azii v drevnie vremena*, I (Moskva-Leningrad, 1950), p. 126; E. H. Parker, *The China Review*, XXI (1894-1895), p. 264.

¹⁰ For the etymology of *yabyu* cf. H. W. Bailey, *Handbuch der Orientalistik* I. 4, 1, p. 136.

Qayan, better known as Mo-ho-ch'o,¹¹ took his rival A-po prisoner. In a letter to the Emperor he asked what he should do with A-po. „Der Kaiser liess darüber beraten. Da schlug Tso-p'u-ye (linker Vizekanzler) Kao Kung vor: „Der Vernichtungskampf zwischen Blutsverwandten schadet der kulturellen Beeinflussung (Seiner Majestät), darum sollen wir ihn (A-po) am Leben lassen und dadurch unsere Grossmütigkeit zeigen.“ Der Kaiser erwiderte: „Gut!“ Daraufhin erhob (Kao) Kung seinen Becher, trat vor und sagte: „Seit der Zeit des Hün-yüan¹² (Huang-ti) haben die Hün-yü^e schon zu vielen Malen unsere Grenzgebiete überfallen. Heute sind auch diejenigen, die weit am Nord-Meer (Baikal See) leben, unsere Vasallen geworden. Solch ein herrliches Ereignis ist noch nie dagewesen. Ich erlaube mir daher, mich vor Seiner Majestät zweimal zu verbeugen und Seiner Majestät ein langes Leben zu wünschen.“¹³

(5) The other passage refers to the year A. D. 626. The Emperor addressed his generals as follows: „Seit alters sind die T'u-küe und China abwechselnd stark, bzw. schwach gewesen. Als zum Beispiel Hün-yüan (Huang-ti) sich in der Kriegsführung auszeichnete, konnte er im Norden die Hün-yü^a verjagen.“¹⁴

Either by an oversight, or because he felt that it would weaken his argument, Pritsak did not quote the passage in *Shih ki*, ch. 1, 10, to which the speakers of the 6th and 7th centuries alluded: “In the North Huang-ti went to the Sea, in the West to the K'ung-t'ung, in the South to the Kiang, in the North he expelled the Hün-yü^a.”¹⁵ These Hün-yü are about as real as Huang-ti, the Yellow Lord, who rode on a bearded dragon.¹⁶

As we see, Hün-yü was not only a 'name' of the Hiung-nu, but also of the Turks. The Hiung-nu were, furthermore, also Hien-yün, or Hien-yün and Hün-yü. I do not think that Pritsak would, on the strength of the passages in the *Sui shu* and *Kiu T'ang shu*, maintain that the real name of the Turks was Hün-yü. He misinterpreted the *Shih ki* passage because he did not recognize its literary flavor. No annalist ever called the Hiung-nu or Turks Hün-yü. It is a designation which occurs *only* in elevated

¹¹ *Baya-čor; cf. P. Pelliot, *T'oung-pao*, XXVI (1929), p. 151; R. N. Frye, *HJAS*, 1951, p. 120; J. R. Hamilton, *Les Ouighours à l'époque des cinq dynasties* (Paris, 1955), p. 147.

¹² Read Hien-yüan.

¹³ Liu, Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Osttürken* (Wiesbaden, 1958), p. 55; Bichurin, *op. cit.*, p. 239

¹⁴ Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

¹⁵ E. Chavannes, *Les Mémoires historiques de Seu-ma Ts'ien*, I, p. 25.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, III, p. 488.

language, in speeches and decrees. *Hün-yü* is an archaistic term: the Hiung-nu were "the Hün-yü of ancient times."^f Such identifications occur in Chinese historiography hundreds of times.

It was, furthermore, not Emperor Wu-ti but Ssu-ma Ts'ien who called the Hiung-nu Hün-yü. He composed the speeches of his heroes as his Roman colleagues composed those of theirs. Besides, he identified the Hiung-nu also with other ancient tribes.

The beginning of Ssu-ma Ts'ien's chapter on the Hiung-nu follows a well known cliché of late Chou and Han literature: "The first ancestor of the people was a scion of the Hia rulers by the name of Shun wei."¹⁷ There were hardly any barbarians, or fabulous peoples,¹⁸ who were not turned into the descendants of the great evil-doers of the past, banished to the "outer" world, or, in later euhemerization, of emigrant princes.

Ssu-ma Ts'ien names also three *peoples* as the ancestors of the Hiung-nu: *Shan* (mountain) *Jung*, *Hien-yün*^g and *Hün-yü*;^a they lived 'before T'ang and Yü.' After a description of the Hiung-nu, obviously the barbarians of his time, Ssu-ma Ts'ien returns to their history. Under the last Hia kings they appeared as *Si* (western) *Jung*. *Jung* and *Ti* attacked Tan fu (T'ai wang). Wen wang fought against the *Küan Yi*^h. King Mu's enemies were the *K'üan* (dog) *Jung*ⁱ. Later the *Hien-yün* devastated China, still later came the *Red Ti* and *White Ti*, and again the *Si Jung* tribes, one of which was called *Kun Jung*^j.

To go on is superfluous. The 'historical' introduction of the Hiung-nu chapter offers a telling example of Ssu-ma Ts'ien's methods. He stitched together whatever he found, be it in legends, songs, or written records, about the troublesome northern barbarians.

Such affiliations and identifications were partly facilitated by the similarity of names, and partly by the lack of any precise information about most of those ancient tribes. As early as the 3rd century B. C., some of them had lost any historical substance they may once have had, and turned into fabulous beings. The *K'üan Jung*, living in the farthest North where the great Yü met them,¹⁹ were now real dogs. They look like dogs, we read in *Shan hai king*^A, ch. 12. *K'üan* was changed into *kou*^k, another word for dog: Yao came as far as *kou kuo*^l, the Dog Kingdom.²⁰

¹⁷ Not mentioned elsewhere.

¹⁸ For instance, the Huan t'ou, San miao, Tsao ch'i, Hing t'ien, Siang liu, Kua fu, Kou ying, and Yü shi in *Shan hai king*^A, chapters 6-9. For the possibly Iranian origin of this idea cf. W. Schultz, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, 1918, 227 ff., 257 ff.

¹⁹ *Lü shih ch'un ts'iu*, ch. 22, quoted G. Haloun, *Seit wann kannten die Chinesen oder Indogermanen überhaupt* (Leipzig, 1926), p. 111, note.

²⁰ *Sin shu* 9(50), quoted *ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

If the K'üan Jung, whose history was fairly well known,²¹ could be changed into dogs, shadowy tribes like the Hün-yü could even more easily be moved back into the distant past and identified with equally obscure peoples.

Whether Ssu-ma Ts'ien meant to say that the Hiung-nu were the successors of the Hien-yün, Hün-yü, K'üan Yi and other tribes of the North, or their physical descendants, is difficult to decide. Writing a political history, he was primarily interested in the genealogy of political entities. In any case, later scholars, who identified the Hiung-nu with this or that barbarian tribe of ancient times, or one tribe with another, could always refer to the *Shih ki*. In the Eastern Han period Cheng H'üan²² equated the *K'üan Yi*^h with the *Kun Yi*^m of Wen wang's time, Ying Shao and Chao K'ü identified the Hün-yü with the Hiung-nu; Fu K'ien added the Hien-yün.²³ Gradually the lists grew longer. Commenting on Hün-yü in *Shih ki*, ch. 1. 10, Ssu-ma Cheng wrote: "This is another name of the Hiung-nu. Before T'ang and Yü they were called Shan Jung and Hün-yü, under the Hsia Shun wei, under the Yin *Kuei fang*ⁿ, under the Chou Hien-yün, under the Han Hiung-nu." The great scholar Wang Kuo-wei went still farther: he took even *hu*^o for a variant of those names,²⁴ and the orthodox Marxist historian Fan Wen-lan faithfully follows the good monarchist Wang Kuo-wei.²⁵ In the West F. Hirth,²⁶ A. Herrmann (with some reservations),²⁷ de Groot²⁸ and others repeated those identifications.

Pritsak is more critical than his predecessors.²⁹ He probably would not

²¹ Haloun, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130; Meng Wen-t'ung, *Yü kung*^B, VI, 7 (1936), pp. 1-16.

²² In the commentary to *Shang shu ta chuan*^c, ed. Ch'en Shou-k'ü, repr. *Ssu pu ts'ung k'an*, ch. 4, 6a.

²³ Cf. G. Haloun, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, XXV, 11 (1922), col. 436; B. Karlgren, *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities*, 17 (1945), p. 141; Uchida Gimpü, *Kyōdo shi kenkyū*^D (Tokyo, 1953), pp. 230-232. Kuo P'o's (276-324) commentary on *Hiung-nu* in *Shan hai king*^A, ch. 10, gives an instructive example of an equation which resulted in a 'correction' of the text. He mentioned the *varia lectio* *Hien-yün*. Obviously a learned scribe, noting that in a book supposedly written by the great Yü, the Hiung-nu could not have been named, transformed them into *Hien-yün*.

²⁴ *Kuan t'ang tsi lin*^E, 13, pp. 1-14; cf. P. Pelliot, *T'oung-pao*, XXVI (1928), pp. 120-123.

²⁵ *Chung kuo t'ung shih kien pien*^F (Shanghai, 1952), p. 50.

²⁶ *The Ancient History of China* (New York, 1911), pp. 67-70: Hün-yü = Hien-yün = K'üan Jung = Kun Yi = Hiung-nu.

²⁷ In Sven Hedin, *Southern Tibet*, VIII (Stockholm, 1922), pp. 131-136.

²⁸ His equations were the most extravagant. He even took *kiang*^{oo} for a variant of Hun, *op. cit.*, II, p. 196.

²⁹ Whom he does not name.

have identified the Hiung-nu with the Hün-yü, had he not thought that the *Shih ki* passage, from which he started, furnished the proof of the sameness of the two peoples. After this turned out not to be the case, Pritsak's equations rest, like the older ones, solely on some similarity of sounds.

In order to transform Hün-yü into **χiwən*, Pritsak has to get rid of the disturbing -yü. He takes it to be an epithet. In addition to Hün-yü in his locus classicus in *Shih ki*, ch. 111, Pritsak adduces the following passages:

(A) Hün-yü^a, *Shih-ki*, ch. 110,2: 'eines der nördlichen Barbarenvölker in der Vor-Chou-Zeit, also vor 1051 v. Chr.'

(B) Hün-yü^e, Meng tzu I, 2, 3: Tan fu (T'ai wang), the ancestor of the Chou, served the Hün-yü.³⁰

(C) Hün-yü^p, *Shih ki*, ch. 4, 6: refers to the same event.

(D) The parallel in *Han shu*, ch. 117, has instead Kuan Yi^h.

There are, first two mistakes to be corrected. (D) deals not with Tan fu's enemies but with those of Kie, the last ruler of the Hia, who, according to the standard chronology, reigned 1818 – 1766 B. C. As to (C), Pritsak apparently mixed up his notes. The *Shih ki* does not give Hün-yü^p but Hün-yü². Besides, yu^r could not be an epithet because it does not mean 'ungeheuer', as Pritsak asserts, but 'to pardon, forgive; lenient.'

As I remarked above, Pritsak ignored Huang-ti's fight with the Hün-yü. What he somewhat vaguely calls 'Pre-Chou time' (A) is the time of Yao und Shun, which would date the Hün-yü, allegedly the Hiung-nu, to the age of the deluge. We are, thus, left with Meng tzu and the *Shih ki*.

Referring to the 'Milchbrei',³¹ mentioned in *Shih ki*, ch. 110, 34, as the staple food of the Hiung-nu, and maintaining that -yü in Hün-yü means 'Brei', Pritsak suggests that Hün-yü was a Chinese nickname: *Xun, die Brei (esser). However, in the meaning 'rice gruel, congee', the graph³² is read *chu/tsjuk/*tjôk*. not *yü/juk/*dîôk* as in the ethnic name. Pritsak's other argument for chopping off -yü is equally wrong. He refers to *Yi Chou shu*^h 7 (59), where *Hiung-nu*^s is supposedly written *Hiung Jung*^t. This proves, he believes, that -nu was an epithet, meaning 'slave.'³³ In

³⁰ Hün-yü KK in *Wu Yüe ch'un ts'iu*^G, *T'ai po chuan*.

³¹ "Milchbrei" is de Groot's translation of *chung lo*^N, *op. cit.*, I, p. 81. Mixing up *lo*^O and *ming*^P, Pritsak writes *chung ming*. *Chung lo* means "milk and cheese".

³² Pritsak refers to GS 1024 a-b; he read only the first line.

³³ On the phonetic value of -nu cf. O. Maenchen-Helfen, "The Ethnic Name Hun", *Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren dedicata* (Copenhagen, 1959), p. 225. It is of course true that in later times -nu was taken to mean "slave". Yü Hi, for instance, in his poem on Ho Ch'ü-ping, *Wen süan* 21, calls the Hiung-nu *lu* Q, "slaves".

analogy to *-nu*, he takes *-yü* also to be an epithet. The *Yi Chou shu* is not a book widely read by turcologists. Pritsak evidently found the reference in Haloun's review of de Groot's *Hunnen*, written in 1922.³⁴ The edition Haloun used that time was, as he later recognized,³⁵ a particularly corrupt one. The correct text³⁶ has, indeed, the usual form *Hiung-nu*^s.

The various forms of *Hün-*, on which Pritsak lays so much emphasis, are as unimportant as those of *-yü*. Such script-variations occur in Pre-Han and Han literature by the hundreds. *Hün-yü* is a bisyllabic name;³⁷ it has nothing to do with **Xun*. *Hün-yün*^b in *Han-shu*, ch. 55, is a scribe's mistake for **Hün-yü*^u.³⁸

The other group of names which in Pritsak's opinion transcribe the real name of the Hiun-nu is centered around **kwän*. By arranging the variants in chronological order, Pritsak thinks he can trace the development from **kwan* to **kun* and **kun* ~ **χun*.

At the top of his list stands *kuan yi*^v in *Shih king*, ode 241. I mention just in passing that the graph which Pritsak reads *hun* is pronounced *kuan* and that it is not an archaic form, as he thinks, but a very late, *kie shu*, one. What really matters is that **kwan yi* has no bearing on the development of the ethnic name because it means 'customs and rules',³⁹

The other *Shih king* verse adduced by Pritsak stands in ode 237; *kun yi tuei yi*^w, 'the Kun Yi scampered away'.⁴⁰ Pritsak again misread the entry in GS, or, rather, he read only the first line of it, and, therefore, wrote '*Hun-i*, **g'wän*, d. i. **gun*.' In the second line Karlgren, following Mao and Yen Shih-ku, states explicitly that the graph in the ethnic name has the pronunciation *kun*, **kwän*. Had Pritsak looked up the commentaries and parallel texts, he would have found that as late as the Eastern Han period neither the verb nor the name had fixed orthographies. The standard version has *kun*^x. In the *Shuo wen kie tzu* (A. D. 100) the *Shih*

³⁴ *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, XXV, 11 (1922), col. 435.

³⁵ *ZDMG*, 91 (1937), p. 298, n.2.

³⁶ See Ho Ts'iu-t'ao, *Wang hui p'ien tsien shih*¹, preface dated 1849, II, llb; cf. also the edition *Ts'ung shu tsi ch'eng*, p. 252.

³⁷ Haloun, *ZDMG*, 91 (1937), p. 318, n. 1, did not state his reasons for assuming that *-yü* was originally written with a character which in archaic Chinese was pronounced **miär*. He may have thought of a passage in the *Shuo wen*, cf. Ma Tsung-ho, *Shuo wen kie tzu yin fang yen k'ao*¹, I (Peking, 1959), pp. 29-31.

³⁸ *-yün*^{ll} occurred also as *varia lectio* in the *Shih ki*, see *Shih ki yin yi*, quoted by P'ei Yin, *Shih ki*, ch. 111, 28. On the other hand, *yü*^{mm} in *Shih king*, ode 35, is a corruption of *yün*ⁿⁿ, cf. A. Waley, *The Book of Songs* (London, 1937), supplement, p. 15.

³⁹ Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 256; B. Karlgren, *The Book of Odes* (Stockholm, 1950), p. 144. Cf. Karlgren, *BMFEA*, 18 (1946), pp. 39-40.

⁴⁰ Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 249; Karlgren, *op. cit.*, 190.

king verse is quoted twice: under class *k'ou* (rad. 30) the name appears as *k'üan*^y, under class *ma* (rad. 187) as *kun*^z, without the signifier 'water'⁴¹, the same form as in Meng tzu 1, 2, 3.⁴² In *Shih ki*, ch. 110, the same people, Wen wang's enemies, are called *Küan Yi*^h, a form which also occurs in *Shang shu ta chuan* (first century B. C.).⁴³ In the (genuine) Bamboo annals the *Küan Yi* fight against the Hia kings.⁴⁴

Unless one is, like Pritsak, *a priori* determined to take **kwän* for a transcription of **Xun*, there is no reason why it should not be what it is, namely **kwän*. If, however, **kwän* and what might be variants of it should stand for a name which the Chinese could only approximately transcribe, it might as well be **kun*, **kün*, or **kyn*. As is known, final *-n* can render foreign *-r*. In other words, the **kwän* can be **kwän*, **kwun*, **kwün*, **kwyn*, **kwer*, **kwur*, **kwür*, **kwyr*, **kun*, **kün*, **kyn*, **kur*, **kür*, and **kyr*.⁴⁵ There are more names which, if only names count, may belong to this group. I recently⁴⁶ referred to *Hun yü*^{aa}, **g'wän iu* in *Shih ki*, ch. 110 (written *Hun yü*^{bb}, **g'wän *dju* in *Han shu*, ch. 94), *Hun ya*^{cc}, **g'wän *ziä*, and *Kün ya*^{dd}, **kiwän *ngä*. There are still more: *Hiu hun*^{ee47}, **xiôg *g'wän*, *Yün*^{ff48}, **giwän*, *K'un*^{gg49}, **k'wän*, *Lu hun*^{hh50}, **liôk *g'wän*, and *Ko k'un*^{ll51}, **klëk *kwän*.

Pritsak's equations are equations of names, not of tribes with a definite economy, special social institutions, living in such and such an area. What is actually known about the *Kun Yi* of Shih king, ode 237? They

⁴¹ Cf. Wu Yü-tsin, *Shuo wen yin king k'ao*^K, ed. Ts'ung shu tsi ch'eng, pp. 23, 133. For other variants see *Tz'u t'ung*, I, p. 111.

⁴² If the inscription on a Middle Chou bell, Karlgren, *BMFEA*, 8 (1936), pl. XLVII, referred to by Pritsak p. 32, should be genuine, this *kun*^Z would be attested before the 7th century B. C. Lo Chen-yü published the inscription (in modern characters) in 1920. It is rather curious that Wang Kuo-wei ignored it and T'ung Yi did not list it in *Yü kung*^B VII, 10, 1937, pp. 10-11, as he should have done had he been convinced of its authenticity. Jung Keng, too, does not mention it in his *Shang Chou yi k'i t'ung k'ao*^L (Peiping, 1941), although he reproduces similar bells and discussed their inscriptions, I, p. 497; II, pls. 498, 499.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, II, 16b.

⁴⁴ Cf. *Ku pen chu shu ki nien tsi kiao ting pu*^M (Shanghai, 1956), pp. 11, 15.

⁴⁵ It may be more than a coincidence that *-r* occurs in the series GS 458 and that *kuei* (n) is archaic **kiwər*.

⁴⁶ Cf. O. Maenchen-Helfen, *op. cit.* p. 224.

⁴⁷ Chavannes, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 47-48.

⁴⁸ Cf. G. Haloun, "Beiträge zur Siedlungsgeschichte chinesischer Clans", *Festschrift für Friedrich Hirth*, p. 9 of the reprint.

⁴⁹ A country east of the "Great Waste", *Shan hai king*^A ch. 15.

⁵⁰ Cf. de Groot, *op. cit.*, I, p. 18.

⁵¹ One of the tribes which Mao-tun conquered in the North between 203 and 200 B. C.; de Groot, *op. cit.*, I, p. 61.

were the enemies of the Chou at the time of Tan fu and/or Wen wang. Waley is inclined to regard Tan fu as a culture-hero.⁵² But even if he was an ancestor of the Chou kings, the events alluded to in the song have no place in history as we understand that term. 'Tout cela n'a que la valeur d'hymnes religieux composés longtemps après l'époque qu'ils chantent, et ne constitue naturellement pas des documents historiques.'⁵³ The hymn preserves, at the best, an old tradition about a war between the Chou and **kwən* tribes somewhere in the valley of the Wei river in Shensi, which is a very long way from the pastures of the Hiung-nu in the Orkhon area. Were the **kwən* farmers, or cattle breeders? Did they fight on foot or from chariots like Chinese? Were the mounted? What language did they speak? We do not know. All we learn from the song is that the *Kun Yi* "panted when they fled."⁵⁴ This, I submit, does not suffice to identify them with the Hiung-nu.

The eastern and northern barbarians of the Western Chou and Han periods were anything but a uniform mass of equestrian nomads.⁵⁵ Nor were they all Proto-Turks (-Chuvash, -Mongols). Haloun assumed that the K'üan Jungⁱ, one of the alleged *Xun peoples, were Indo-Tibetans.⁵⁶ To quote Maspero again: 'Je ne sais pourquoi la plupart des historiens européens ont voulu que tous les peuples dits barbares furent d'origine absolument différente des Chinois.'⁵⁷

I am under no illusion that my criticism will stop the merry game of name-hunting. But I may use this opportunity to draw attention to the analogies to the Chinese equations of old and new peoples in Byzantine historiography.

There are none in the Latin West. In calling the Huns by their proper name, the Latin chroniclers of the 5th century were less guided by the intention to be precise than forced to be factual by their ignorance. They knew next to nothing about the Scyths, Cimmerians, and Massagetae, whose names the Greek authors constantly interchanged with that of the Huns. However, even at a time when there still existed a Latin literature not unworthy of its illustrious past, the writers shunned the circumlocutions and equations in which the Greeks indulged. Ausonius rarely

⁵² *Op. cit.*, p. 247.

⁵³ H. Maspero, *La Chine antique* (Paris, 1955), p. 45, n. 1.

⁵⁴ Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 249; Karlgren, *BMFEA*, 18 (1946), 29.

⁵⁵ Cf. O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (London-New-York, 1940), pp. 347-348.

⁵⁶ *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, XXV, 11 (1922), coll. 436-437.

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 9, n. 1.

missed an opportunity to show how well read he was, yet he refrained from substituting the real names of the barbarians whom Emperor Gratian fought in Pannonia for those he knew from Livy and Ovid.⁵⁸ Ambrose, too, avoided the use of archaistic names. The Huns, not the Massagetae, attacked the Alans; the Alans threw themselves upon the Goths, not the Scyths.⁵⁹ In the former high official Roman soberness and aversion to speculation were as much alive as in the rhetor from Bourdeaux. A comparison of Pacatus' Panegyric on Theodosius with the orations of Themistius is revealing. The Gaul called the Huns by their name;⁶⁰ the Greek called them Massagetae.⁶¹

The Byzantine historians identified the Huns with Cimmerians, Scyths, and other peoples of the past not just to display their knowledge, or to embellish their accounts,⁶² but, first of all, because they were convinced that there were no peoples which the wise men of former generations had not known. And this, in turn, was not so much narrowminded traditionalism – it was that too – as, to use a psychological term, a defense mechanism. In his Address on Kingship⁶³ Synesius said clearly why there were, why there could not be new barbarians: "Now it was not by walling off their own house that the former rulers prevented the barbarians either of Asia or Europe from entering it. Rather by their own acts did they admonish these men to wall off their own by crossing the Euphrates in pursuit of the Parthians, and the Danube in pursuit of the Goths and Massagetae. But now these nations spread terror amongst us, crossing over in their turn, assuming other names, and some of them falsifying by art even their countenances, so that another race new and foreign may appear to have sprung from the soil." This was carrying the thesis of the

⁵⁸ *Precatio consulis designati pridie kal. Ian. fascibus sumptis* 31–35; *Epigr.*, XXVI, 8–10; *Ephemeris* 7 (8), 18.

⁵⁹ *Expositio evangelii Lucae*, X, 10.

⁶⁰ *Latini Pacati Drepanii Panegyricus Theodosio Augusto Dictus* XI, 4, *Panegyriques Latins* III, ed. E. Galletier (Paris, 1955), p. 78.

⁶¹ *Oratio* XV, Harduin 207c: "The stubbornness of the Scythians, the recklessness of the Alans, the madness of the Massagetae." Except *or.* IX, Harduin 121b, and *or.* XIV, Harduin 181b, where Scythians is a generic name of all Transdanubian tribes, the Scythians are the Goths (*or.* VIII; *or.* XVI, Harduin 210d, 211b; *or.* XVIII, Harduin 219b; *or.* XIX, Harduin 229b,c; in *or.* XI, Harduin 146b; Athanaric is called Σκυθῆς ἢ Γέττης). The Alans are also in *or.* XXXIV, 8 called by their proper name. The Massagetae, the third of the peoples which in the 380's devastated the northern Balkan provinces, must, therefore, be the Huns. In *or.* XXIV, 24 Themistius makes a sharp distinction between Scythians and Massagetae.

⁶² See Agathias II, 5, ed. Bonn p. 147 on his reasons for calling the fortress St. Stephen by its former name Onoguris.

⁶³ *De regno* 11; *The Essays and Hymns of Synesius of Cyrene*, transl. by A. FitzGerald, I (Oxford, 1930), p. 127.

identity of the old and new barbarians to absurdity. But it was, after all, what so many Roman generals said so many times on the eve of a battle: our fathers conquered them, we will conquer them again. The ever recurring οἱ πάλαι serves the same purpose. It deprives the new and unknown attacker of his most frightening feature: he *is* known and, therefore, need not be feared.

In the equation of the the Huns and the peoples of former times both motives, the emotionally conditioned *reductio ad notum*, and the intention of the learned historian to display his erudition play their role. With which of the known peoples an author identified the Huns, depended upon his actual information, the particular circumstances under which he wrote, and the alleged similarity between the known and the barely known. The result was invariably the same. All Byzantine speculations about the origin of the Huns ended in an equation.

Philostorgius 'recognized' in them the Neuri.⁶⁴ A well read man, he may have come across a now lost description of the Neuri which reminded him of what he had heard about the Huns. One could think that Philostorgius, less critical than Herodotus,⁶⁵ believed in the were-wolf stories about the Neuri. Synesius⁶⁶ and Jerome⁶⁷ were probably not the only ones to compare the Huns with wolves. Philostorgius was quite capable of identifying the wolfish Huns with the were-wolves of Scythia. But the most likely explanation is to be sought in the location of the Neuri. The Huns came from the extreme North. The Neuri were the northernmost people. *Ergo* the Huns were the Neuri. To say that the Huns lived along the Rhipaeen Mountains, as Philostorgius did, was merely another way of placing them as far north as possible; since Aristeas the Rhipaeen Mountains were regarded as the region of eternal snow, the home of icy Boreas.

Procopius' identification of the Huns and Utigur with the Cimmerians⁶⁸ is neither better nor worse than his assertion that the Goths, Vandals, Visigoths, and Gepids were in former times called Sauromatae.⁶⁹ As a rule, Procopius, like Themistius and Claudian,⁷⁰ equated the Huns and

⁶⁴ *Hist. eccles.*, IX, 17, ed. Bidez, p. 123.

⁶⁵ *Herodotus*, IV, 107.

⁶⁶ The "wolf" in the Egyptian Tale is "the Hun", cf. G. Grützmacher, *Synesios von Kyrene* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 58; Ch. Lacombrade, *Revue des études antiques*, XLVIII (1946), pp. 26-266.

⁶⁷ *Epist.*, 60, 16.

⁶⁸ Cf. Gy. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, II (Budapest, 1958), p. 160.

⁶⁹ III, 22,3.

⁷⁰ The Massagetae in *In Rufinum* I, 310 correspond to the Chuni in *Cons. Stil.*, I, III.

the Massagetae⁷¹ Later Byzantine writers monotonously repeated the formula: the former X – the later Y. Theophylactus Simocatta and the author of the tactical handbook which goes under the name of Mauricius called the Turks Huns,⁷² exactly as Sui and T'ang authors made the Hiung-nu the ancestors of the Turks.⁷³

Old Slavonic *hyn* or *hin* offers an instructive example of the secondary use of an archaistic ethnic name. It is first attested in the Song of Igor: Хинови (105), Хынове (135), Хиновские (174). Hynove has been interpreted as the people of Khinov,⁷⁴ a city north of the Azov Sea, as Kumans,⁷⁵ and as Huns.⁷⁶ There can be no doubt that Hyn means Huns. The 'Huns' of the Song of Igor were the Hungarians.⁷⁷ The Russians borrowed the archaistic name from the Byzantines.

INDEX OF CHINESE WORDS

- | | |
|------------|----------------|
| (A) 山海經 | (J) 說文解字引方言攷 |
| (B) 禹貢 | (K) 說文引經攷 |
| (C) 尚書大傳 | (L) 尚周彝器通考 |
| (D) 匈奴史研究 | (M) 古本竹書紀年輯校訂補 |
| (E) 觀堂集林 | (N) 史記會注考證 |
| (F) 中國通史簡編 | (N) 渾醪 |
| (G) 吳越春秋 | (O) 醪 |
| (H) 逸周書 | (P) 醪 |
| (I) 王會篇箋釋 | (Q) 醪 |

⁷¹ Cf. Moravcsik, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 234–235.

⁷³ Cf., e. g., E. Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) occidentaux* (St.-Petersbourg, 1903), p. 16; Liu, *op. cit.*, pp. 165, 199, 286, 369.

⁷⁴ Cf. D. A. Rasovskii, "Chinova", *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, VIII (1936), pp. 301–306.

⁷⁵ A. Brückner, *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie*, 14 (1931), p. 50, note 1.

⁷⁶ C. A. Sobolevskii, "Altrussisch хынь", *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, 30 (1909), p. 474.

⁷⁷ M. Szeftel in "La Geste du Prince Igor", *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, VII (1945–1947), pp. 123, 143–144; R. Jakobson, *ibid.*, p. 339.

(a) 葷粥	(k) 狗	(v) 串夷	(gg) 困
(b) 葷允	(l) 狗國	(w) 混夷駢矢	(hh) 陸渾
(c) 獾狁	(m) 混夷	(x) 混	(ii) 隔昆
(d) 獾粥	(n) 鬼方	(y) 犬	(kk) 薰鬻
(e) 獾鬻	(o) 胡	(z) 昆	(ll) 允
(f) 昔獾粥	(p) 葷宥	(aa) 渾庾	(mm) 育
(g) 獾狁	(q) 薰育	(bb) 渾崱	(nn) 云
(h) 畎夷	(r) 宥	(cc) 渾邪	(oo) 羌
(i) 犬夷	(s) 匈奴	(dd) 君牙	
(j) 緄夷	(t) 匈奴	(ee) 休溷	
	(u) 葷育	(ff) 鄆	

ZUR „BEWEINUNGSSZENE“ AUS PENDŽIKENT

I. DIE VERBRENNUNG DER LEICHE BUDDHAS ALS KOMPOSITIONSVORBILD?

von

K. JETTMAR

Mainz

Seit 1946 gräbt man laufend in Ruinenhügeln, die 68 km oberhalb von Samarkand am linken Ufer des Zarafschan liegen, am Zugang zu den Gebirgstälern Nord-Tadschikistans. Es handelt sich zweifellos¹ um die Reste der soghdischen Stadt Pendžikent, die ein wichtiges politisches und religiöses Zentrum bildete, die Residenz eines Fürsten. Sie wurde in den zwanziger Jahren des 8. Jh. von den Arabern erobert und etwa 50 Jahre später von den Einwohnern verlassen.² Während man früher an ein nur kurzes Bestehen der Anlage glaubte, kennt man seit 1955 auch eine untere Schicht, die spätestens im 6. Jh. einsetzt.³ Deutlich kann man die Gliederung in Zitadelle, Schahristān und Vorstadt erkennen. Etwa einen halben Kilometer davon entfernt liegt die Nekropole.⁴

Pendžikent hat alle Erwartungen seiner Ausgräber weit übertroffen. Es lieferte neben reichen Münzbeständen,⁵ vereinzelt epigraphischen Denkmälern und sonstigen Kleinfunden auch die Reste einer monumentalen Lehmplastik. Selbst Holzschnitzereien, darunter eine künstlerisch wertvolle „Tänzerin“, sind durch Verkohlungen erhalten geblieben.⁶ Am kostbarsten jedoch sind Wandmalereien, die auf den oft bis zur Höhe des ersten Stockwerks aufragenden Mauern erhalten geblieben sind. Man findet sie sowohl in profanen als auch in kultischen Bauten, nämlich an den Wänden von Anlagen (Objekt I und II), die für Wohnzwecke ungeeignet sind und die man sicher zu Recht als Tempel bezeichnet. Die Frage,

¹ Der Name hat sich für eine benachbarte Siedlung erhalten.

² D'jakonov, 1951, S. 34.

³ Belenickij, 1959, S. 195–196.

⁴ Vgl. Staviskij, *Bol' šakov und Mončadskaja* (1953).

⁵ Vgl. Smirnova, 1955a und 1955b, 1956. In Objekt II kam der erste Schatzfund soghdischer Prägungen zutage. Es handelt sich meist um Kupfer nach chinesischem Vorbild. Immer häufiger werden arabische Münzen der frühen Abbassidenzeit. Chinesische und heptalitische Gepräge bleiben vereinzelt.

⁶ Belenickij, 1959a, S. 144–152.

welcher Religion sie zugehören, wurde von Belenickij zunächst dahingehend beantwortet, daß sie manichäisch⁷ seien. Heute entscheidet man sich wohl allgemein für eine der mittelasiatischen Spielarten der iranischen Volksreligion, nicht für den Zoroastrismus.

Der uns hier interessierende Tempel II liegt in einem teilweise von Wirtschaftsräumen umgebenen, rechteckigen Hof (etwa 70 × 50 m). Er ist ziemlich genau nach den Himmelsrichtungen orientiert, die Langseiten liegen im Norden und Süden. In der Mitte der östlichen Schmalseite öffnet sich das Haupttor. Es war beiderseits von Reliefs umgeben, die seltsamerweise mythische Wasserwesen und Fische zeigen. Deutlich läßt sich das Nachwirken einer späthellenistischen Tradition erkennen. Belenickij nimmt an, daß diese Kunstwerke noch im 5. Jh. entstanden seien und erst sekundär an der gegenwärtigen Stelle zur Aufstellung gelangten, wo sie leider bis auf geringe Reste vernichtet wurden. Vermutlich gehörten sie zum Heiligtum eines Flußgottes.⁸

Der Tempel, etwa 30 × 30 m groß, besteht aus einer rechteckigen Cella, der im Osten eine von vier Säulen getragene quadratische Halle vortgelagert ist. Ihre Ostwand ist offen, davor liegt eine niedrige Plattform, ohne Säulen, aber von starken Mauern flankiert.

Auf den Innenseiten dieser Flankierungsmauern sind die Reste von Wandgemälden erhalten, die Reiter mit eigenartigen Kronen und offenbar ritueller Handhaltung erkennen lassen. Man sieht in ihnen Angehörige des soghdischen Adels, die zum Fest im Tempel angeritten kommen.⁹ Die Halle selbst zeigte an der Westwand, die durch den Zugang zur Cella und zwei Nischen gegliedert war, die Bilder einzelner Gestalten.¹⁰ An der Nordwand bleiben Pferde¹¹ und Menschengestalten kaum erkennbar.

Die Südwand jedoch zeigt eine komplizierte Komposition, von der freilich nur das Zentrum gut erhalten ist. Die linke Seite ist weit stärker zerstört, die rechte läßt sich kaum rekonstruieren. Das dargestellte Thema ist so interessant, daß Zentrum und linker Teil mehrfach kopiert, abgebildet und beschrieben wurden.¹²

⁷ Belenickij, 1954b.

⁸ Beste Darstellung auf den Tafeln zu Belenickij, 1959b (XXVII–XXXIX).

⁹ D'jakonov, 1954, S. 109–110.

¹⁰ D'jakonov, 1954, S. 110–111.

¹¹ D'jakonov, 1954, S. 113.

¹² z. B. Jakubovskij, 1950, S. 53, Tafel 58; 1951, S. 250–258, Abb. bei S. 256. D'jakonov, 1951, S. 34f, 37, Abb. 4; 1954, S. 111–113 mit weiteren Angaben. Tafeln XIX–XXIII, darunter beste, farbige Wiedergaben (keine Photographien!). Belenickij, 1953, S. 339, Abb. 10. Zu den technischen Einzelheiten vgl. Kostrov, 1954 und 1959, S. 165–168.

Im Zentrum ist ein Pavillon oder Katafalk erkennbar, in dem eine jugendliche, vermutlich männlich Gestalt aufgebahrt ist. Sie ist bekleidet oder in ein Tuch gehüllt und trägt einen komplizierten gelben (goldenen?) Kopfschmuck, der an einen Helm erinnert.¹³ Später sprach man von Krone oder Helm.¹⁴ Dahinter erkennt man durch die Rundbogenfenster des Pavillons drei klagende Frauen mit nacktem Oberkörper. Im Vordergrund, außerhalb des Pavillons sehen wir drei Reihen von insgesamt elf Personen. Sie bringen entweder Gegenstände, von denen ein Gefäß deutlich erkennbar ist, oder zeigen Gesten leiderschaftlicher Trauer. Einige zerschneiden sich das Gesicht.

Es handelt sich nach der Ansicht der Bearbeiter um Männer und Frauen. Sie sind kaum durch Kleider verhüllt. Vier Männer fallen durch rotbraune Hauttönung und durch einen Schnurrbart auf. Die Hautfarbe der anderen Personen ist viel heller, sie war ursprünglich gelblich. Die Bedeutung einer Gestalt ganz rechts, von der nur Kopf und Schulter sichtbar sind, bleibt unklar. Rechts im Hintergrund erkennt man die Zinnen einer Stadtmauer. Der linke Teil des Bildes wird von drei größeren, mit einem Nimbus umgebenen, vermutlich weiblichen Figuren eingenommen. Die größte davon hat vier Arme, die links vor ihr knieende hält eine brennende Fackel zur Erde. In dem fast völlig zerstörten rechten Abschnitt glaubt man, eine Reihe stürzender Gestalten (mit dem Kopf nach unten), sowie einen Reiter zu erkennen.

Noch während der Ausgrabungsarbeiten vertraten Terenožkin und Jakubovskij die Meinung,¹⁵ es handle sich um eine aus dem mittelasiatischen Epos bekannte Episode, den Tod des Siyāvush. D'jakonov widmete dieser Deutung einen eigenen Aufsatz.¹⁶ Dabei stützen sich die Forscher vor allem auf die Tatsache, daß Siyāvush als Heros und Stadtgründer von Buchara die Züge der zerstückelten Gottheit, des „sterbenden und wiederauferstehenden Gottes“ annahm.¹⁷ Das Gemälde stelle die Vorbereitung zur Verbrennung seiner Leiche dar,¹⁸ unter Teilnahme von Göttern und Menschen, Soghdien und Türken. Damit habe man auch die Möglichkeit, das Nebeneinander von hellhäutigen und dunkelhäutigen Trauernden zu erklären. Der fast verschwundene rechte Abschnitt habe dann den Sturz der Sünder von der Höllenbrücke gezeigt.¹⁹

¹³ D'jakonov 1954, S. 111.

¹⁴ D'jakonova-Smirnova, 1960, S. 173f.


¹⁵ Vgl. Belenickij, 1954, S. 80.

¹⁶ D'jakonov, 1951.


¹⁷ Z. B. Barthold, 1958, S. 107. Chavannes, 1900, S. 133.

¹⁸ Besonders Belenickij, 1954, S. 82.

¹⁹ Jakubovskij, 1951, S. 256.



Beweinungsszene nach: *Živopis' drevnego Pjandzikenta ANSSSR* (Moskva, 1954),
Tafel XIX.



Diese Deutung ist wohl mit Recht bezweifelt worden. D'jakonova und Smirnova²⁰ haben angeführt, daß der Siyāvush der Heldensage keineswegs verbrannt, sondern nach zoroastrischem Ritus ausgesetzt worden sei. Es habe auch gar nicht den Anschein, als wolle die fackeltragende Gestalt den Katafalk anzünden. Andererseits sei auch die Zerstückelung, die offenbar in Buchara zum Bild des vergöttlichten Heroen gehörte, in keiner Weise angedeutet. Der fürstliche Tote zeige keinerlei Spuren eines gewaltsamen Endes. Statt dessen stellen die Autorinnen die – vermutlich ebenso problematische – Hypothese auf, es sei hier der Sohn des Siyāvush, Firud, gemeint. Er sei ebenso tragisch umgekommen, seine Mutter habe an seiner Leiche Selbstmord verübt, außerdem sei aber von ihm wenigstens belegt, daß man seine Schätze verbrannt habe, um sie vor den eben eindringenden Iranern zu schützen. Er sei durch seine doppelte Abkunft Herr über Iranier und Türken gewesen. Die Autorinnen betonen gleichzeitig die Verwurzelung der Darstellungen im iranischen Epos und in der iranischen Volksreligion, erinnern aber auch an den Einfluß der buddhistischen Wandmalerei, die in Ostturkestan blühte.

Seltsamerweise werden trotz des eben erwähnten Hinweises auf Ostturkestan in der gesamten vorliegenden Literatur jene detaillierten Übereinstimmungen nicht erwähnt, die zwischen dieser Darstellung und der Verbrennungsszene Buddhas auf Wandbildern in Ostturkestan bestehen. Man vergleiche die Beschreibung, die Grünwedel²¹ von einer dieser Darstellungen gibt:

Ming-Öi bei Kyzyl, 3. Anlage, Höhle 5, Mâyâhöhle. Verbrennung von Buddhas Leiche, eine Göttin zu Füßen bringt Sprengopfer aus einer Schale, ein Gott dahinter hält ein Candrahâra, ein dritter gießt mit einem Topfe, der in eine Gabelstange gezwängt ist, etwas in das auflohende Feuer. Zu Häupten des Sarges ein kniender Gott (weiß) mit Schirm, zwei Mönche und eine Gottheit. Im Vordergrund ein mit ausgebreiteten Armen zu Boden stürzender junger Mönch und ein Betender. Der Sarg ist noch offen, Buddha, wie eine Mumie. Am Kopfteil des Sarges steht der Drachenkopf vor, am Fußteil der Schweif. Über dem Verbrennungsbild ein Balkon mit Männern und Frauen, welche sich wilden Ausbrüchen der Trauer hingeben. Drei Männer schneiden sich die Stirnhaut entzwei, ein anderer die Brust (Fig. 415).

Bei dieser Sachlage muß man sich fragen, ob man nicht vor der Deutung alle jene Elemente aussondern müßte, die durch die Übertragung eines fremden Sujets in das iranische Milieu hineingebracht wurden.²² Mög-

²⁰ D'jakonova und Smirnova, 1960, S. 173–179.

²¹ Vgl. Grünwedel, 1912, S. 179. Weitere Hinweise S. 47f, 61, 132, 171, 298. Grünwedel, 1920, II, S. 107f, Taf. XLIV/XLV.

²² An einer im Völkerkundemuseum in Berlin ausgestellten Beweinungsszene fällt ebenfalls das Nebeneinander von hellhäutigen und dunkelhäutigen Trauernden auf.

licherweise mußte der eigene Vorwurf zurechtgebogen werden, um die Komposition zu wahren. Es ist dabei zu berücksichtigen, daß gerade die Wandbilder des Tempels II in Ornament und Technik eine Reihe von Eigentümlichkeiten aufweisen.²³ Auch sie könnten durch Beziehungen zu Ostturkestan bedingt sein.

Die Darstellung ist also bisher nicht befriedigend erklärt. Vielleicht kann die anschliessend mitgeteilte Beobachtung weiterhelfen.

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II. DIE KRONE DES „BEWEINTEN“ — EINE PARAPHRASE DER KRONE DES SASANIDEN BAHRĀM IV.

von

ROBERT GÖBL

Wien

Ich verdanke die Kenntnis der zugrundeliegenden Publikation sowie – da ich des russischen Idioms nicht mächtig bin – die Übersetzung der mir für den Zusammenhang wichtigen Stellen der Güte K. Jettmars. Da ich seit Jahren unter anderem besonders mit den Problemen der sasanidischen Kronen und ihrer Fortwirkungen befaßt bin, richtete sich mein Augenmerk in erster Linie auf die Krone, die der Tote in der „Beweinungsszene“ trägt. Daß die Wandgemälde allgemein mit Paraphrasen sasanidischer Kronenformen nicht geizen, erweisen andere Tafeln des Werkes wie z. B. XXIV, XXXVI, XXXVIII, XXXIX, im zweiten Band u. a. die Tafeln VIII und XVII.

Eine zusammenfassende Untersuchung alldieser Formen könnte unter Umständen zu recht interessanten Ergebnissen führen. Für das hier herangezogene Detail läßt sich jedenfalls mit ziemlicher Sicherheit nachweisen, daß eine und zwar recht bestimmte Krone eines Sasaniden das Vorbild abgegeben hat. An Elementen (s. Abb. 1) sind erkennbar (wobei wir den Kopf des Beweinten zum besseren Vergleich um 90 Grad nach links drehen): Einmal ein Flügel, ein Kreis oder eine Rosette, dann eine Folge von drei Zinnen. Den Hintergrund des rechten Teiles bildet ein Bogen, in dem wir unschwer den bekannten „Globus“ der sasanidischen

Königskronen erkennen, jenen kugeligen Frisurballen, der mehr auf dem Vorderteil des Kopfes sitzt und früher oder später ein vom Haupthaar unabhängiger Kronenbestandteil geworden ist. Daß unsere Auffassung richtig ist, beweisen die dunkler gehaltenen Spuren des zweiten Flügels, der an sich - wie u. a. die Münzbilder zeigen - immer höher gedreht war als der dem Beschauer zugekehrte rechte, hier zudem in die Arkade hineingepaßt werden mußte. Dazu kommt, daß die zeitliche Entfernung




Abb. 1




Abb. 2

vom ursprünglichen Vorbild manche Vereinfachung gebracht haben wird. Natürlich ist, um die Krone deutlicher zu zeigen, diese gegenüber dem Kopf gedreht worden, ein Darstellungskniff, für den es besonders in der sasanidischen Kunst selbst reiche Parallelen gibt. Rein räumlich-tatsächlich wäre andererseits schon diese Drehung gerechtfertigt, denn wenn man einem Liegenden die Krone wirklich auflassen will, ohne sein Gesicht mitzudrehen, dann muß man die Krone dem Haupt etwas gedreht aufsetzen. Hingegen ist es dem Nichtverstehen der Vorlage anzurechnen, daß der Bänderknoten hinter Krone rechts statt links gesetzt wurde.

Es gibt eine einzige sasanidische Krone, die für den Vergleich und die Ableitung wirklich in Frage kommt, nämlich jene Bahräms IV. (Abb. 2). Es ist dies übrigens jener Herrscher, der die Flügel des Siegesgottes Verəθragna erstmalig gemeinsam mit den Zinnen der Krone des Ahura Mazdäh in seine Krone aufnimmt (Erdmann 102, Göbl 60). In der Erklärung fehlt nun noch die kleine Rosette, die sich in der Krone Bahräms IV. nicht findet, die aber wahrscheinlich durch Vereinfachung aus dem oft mindestens halbkreisförmig gebildeten Flügelansatz, der im Gegensatz zu den langen Schwingenfedern aus kleinem schuppigen Flaum besteht, zur malerischen Attraktion geworden ist. Anzeichen für die geometrische Auflösung der symbolisch so bedeutsamen Schwinge bietet

die sasanidische Kunst besonders der späteren Zeit in so reicher Fülle, daß ich mir die Anführung von Beispielen versagen kann, weil sie mehr als hinlänglich bekannt sind.

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SINKIANG UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNOR YANG TSENG-HSIN, 1911-1928

by

RICHARD YANG

Los Angeles

When the Chinese Revolution succeeded in China proper in 1911, Yang Tseng-hsin took over administrative power in Sinkiang and thus became the first provincial governor under the new republican régime. Yuan Ta-hua, the last governor of Sinkiang under the old Manchu dynasty, was forced to resign because of his inability to cope with the situation. With Moslem troops under his command, Yang was the only man capable of handling the emergency there. As the revolutionary tide swept over the province, only a military man with sufficient force behind him was able to cope with the situation. Thus, Yang's assumption of power was both natural and logical. His official title as governor of Sinkiang was later recognized by the first president of the Chinese Republic, Yuan Shin-k'ai.¹

The remarks which Yang Tseng-hsin made when he took office from his predecessor, Governor Yuan, clearly indicated his perfect understanding of the Sinkiang situation at that time, an important presage of his later success. He said in part in a letter to President Yuan:

Sinkiang has been isolated in the remotest area of China. Since the Han and T'ang dynasties, adherence to and independence from China has successively occurred. Whenever China was involved in civil disturbances and the power of the Central Government could not reach this area, the native tribes would take advantage of that situation to claim their independence. However, if China proper was in peace and prosperity, then its influence could also extend to the remotest territory . . . But the situation at the present time is different. After the Ch'ing Dynasty reconquered this region and made it a province, the Central Government had to bear huge expenditures both for military campaigns and for subsidies to the local government. If the Central Government should lose its hold upon this territory, then with the presence of powerful neighbors watching from outside and greedy Mongolia watching from within, this beautiful piece of land would easily fall into the hands of other peoples . . .

¹ See Hung, Ti-ch'en, *Hsin-chiang shih-ti ta-kang* ("An Outline of the History and Geography of Sinkiang") (Chungking, 1939), p. 198.

Let us look at the whole world today. Territories such as the barren African and Australian continents and the icy lands of the Arctic and Antarctic have already been dismembered by the strong powers. Ambitious nations have spent money and used force to obtain a small piece of territory. If they achieve their purpose, the whole nation rejoices at such a gain. Our country, on the contrary, throws away thousands of miles of land like a pair of old shoes. Isn't this lamentable? Now you entrust the provincial duty to me. I shall not refuse, because I feel that it is high time for a man to do something for his country. Success or failure is not what we should count.²

It was with this clear understanding and daring decision that Yang took office as the first governor of Sinkiang under the new régime established in China in 1911.

Of course, his best qualification for becoming a local leader in a remote territory at the time of national revolution was that he had military power in his hands. The military group which Yang commanded was a group of Moslem soldiers organized by his predecessor during the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty. Yang Tseng-hsin had been appointed commanding officer of this Moslem garrison. When his governorship was approved by the Central Government in Peking, he immediately sought official recognition by the Central Government for his policy of keeping these troops in Sinkiang. In his report to Peking, he gave the following reasons for his action:

In my own opinion there are several reasons for recruiting Moslem soldiers in Sinkiang: First, Sinkiang is located in the remotest border area where Chinese are few but Moslems are natives. Since they all have their families in Sinkiang, it is easier to recruit them and obtain their loyalty. In the interior provinces natives are usually selected to serve in the army. But in remote Sinkiang, the natives are Moslems, not Chinese. Thus to recruit Moslems to serve in the armed forces is, in reality, to follow the same policy of the Central Government.

Second, since Mongolia has proclaimed its independence, other peoples elsewhere, particularly the Moslems in Sinkiang, have been also stirred up to follow suit by some undesirable elements among them. The best way to cope with this situation is to offer them a chance to serve in the army, and military service would certainly keep them from engaging in subversive activities.

Third, the local authorities have, for many years, employed different races in the military garrison, such as Chinese, Mongols, Moslems and Uighurs. The purpose of this policy was to eliminate racial barriers among the races so as to stamp out prejudices and discrimination. If it was right for the Ili Government³ to use Moslems, it is certainly right for Sinkiang to use them.

² See Wu, Shao-lin, *Hsin-chiang kai-kuan* ("A General Outlook of Sinkiang") (Nanking, 1933), p. 111.

³ The Ili Government was organized by the revolutionary party in Sinkiang after the Revolution started in China in 1911. The relationship between Ili and Sinkiang will be discussed later in the paper.

Fourth, in the early years during the reign of Kuang-hsü of the Manchu dynasty when the Uighurs in Sinkiang rebelled, the troops led by General Liu Chin-t'ang⁴ in the pacification of the revolt were chiefly Moslem. General Liu commanded them and trusted them, and the result was a great success. Moreover, when Ts'en Yü-ying⁵ was in charge of the military affairs in Yun-nan province, he also used a number of Moslem soldiers and subsequently the rebellion there was suppressed. If the Moslem troops could be used for suppressing uprisings, why can't we use them now in time of peace when we are on good terms with them?

Fifth, the Fifth Article of the Constitution (of the Republic) guarantees that the peoples within the Republic are all equal without any racial or religious discrimination; and the Fourteenth Article stipulates that under law people have the obligation to serve in the armed forces. The Moslems in Sinkiang have the same language and customs as the Chinese. Besides, religious freedom is also guaranteed by the Constitution. If these people are not allowed to serve in the military forces, they are not being treated on the basis of equality.

Sixth, when Great Britain took over India she enlisted natives as soldiers. When France conquered Indo-China she also used natives in her army. None of these powers ever used solely their own people in the army. Thus it is common policy for colonial powers to use natives as soldiers. Sinkiang has been attached to China for more than a hundred years now and cannot be compared with those colonies. It would be entirely mistaken to deny the right of the Moslem population here to serve in the army.⁶

Actually, behind these high-sounding reasons for keeping Moslem troops in Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin, as the new governor of that province, had other practical considerations.

First of all, there were quite a few Chinese groups in that province hostile to Yang and his administration. These groups had demonstrated jealousy and hostility to one another. Their influence was deep-rooted in the local Chinese troops. The only way for any governor to keep a balance of power among these groups would be for him to employ natives other than Chinese to serve in the local army.

⁴ Liu Chin-t'ang (1844-1894) was a general under the command of the famous Tso Tsung-t'ang who pacified the Moslem trouble during the Ch'ing dynasty and was appointed the first governor of that territory by the Manchu Government from 1884 to 1889.

⁵ Ts'en Yu-ying (1829-1889) was another general sent by the Manchu Government to Yun-nan province to crush down the rebellion of the Nien people. His biography may be found in Arthur W. Hummel's *Emminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, 1944), pp. 742-746.

⁶ The main source for this article is Yang Tseng-hsin's memoirs entitled *Pu-kuo-chai wen-tu* ("Documents of the Fault-Remission Studio"), a compilation of official papers during his administration as governor of Sinkiang province, published privately in Nanking, 1921; there are altogether twelve volumes, each volume has two parts (I and II), and each part has three chapters (A-B-C). This quotation is taken from the fifth volume (V), Part I (I) and Chapter A (A), pp. 103.

Second, so far as national defense was concerned, it was impossible to rely on the small Chinese population in Sinkiang. Thus, the only sensible remedy was to make use of natives during a time of national emergency, and the Moslems were, of course, the logical choice. Furthermore, because of difficulties in transportation it seemed both unwise and impossible to recruit troops from outside, nor was it possible to ask for help from other localities in time of national emergency. Because of this consideration, Governor Yang urged the Central Government to permit him to keep the Moslem garrison in Sinkiang.

Third, after General Tso Tsung-t'ang⁷ regained the territory of Sinkiang during the Ch'ing dynasty, his troops introduced many secret societies⁸ into Sinkiang, among which the most prominent one was the Red Society, of which the Ko-lao-hui was a leading sect. This secret society soon became very popular and powerful among the Chinese as most of them sought either refuge or protection from this organization in time of chaos. It seemed that the most effective way to check its growth and expansion was to combat it with the help of other organizations. The Moslems, as a religious group, had a strong organization and could be used to check the Chinese secret society. Knowing the situation well, Yang Tseng-Hsin was anxious to keep this Moslem garrison in Sinkiang.

Fourth, the population of Sinkiang was composed of various racial groups, such as Mongols, Kasakhs, Moslems and Uighurs. These racial groups were also the elements composing the population of neighboring Russia. Should these peoples join hands and make trouble, Sinkiang would face a grave situation. For example, if the Mongols of Russia and Sinkiang should join hands and revolt, the areas of Kobdo and Altai in Sinkiang would be in great danger. Similarly, if the Uighurs of the two countries should rebel, then the whole of Southern Sinkiang would be involved in danger. The Moslems could do greater damage should they

⁷ General Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-1885) was the man sent by the Ch'ing court to pacify the Moslem rebellion in Sinkiang and later served as its first governor of the territory under the Manchu regime. His biography is included in Hummels' book, *op. cit.*, pp. 762-767.

⁸ Of the many secret societies in China at that time, the Ko-lao-hui (or the Society of the Elder Brothers) was the most popular one whose main purpose was to overthrow the Manchu regime and restore the political power to the Chinese. When the revolution started under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, the members of the Ko-lao-hui gave their whole-hearted support to the Revolutionary Party. For a full account of the secret societies of China, see Ping Shan-chou's *Chung-kuo mi-mi she-hui shih* ("History of the Chinese Secret Societies") (Shanghai, 1934); or Hsu K'o, *Ch'ing pei lei ch'ao* ("Categorized Documents of Ch'ing dynasty") (Shanghai, 1917).

decide to become an independent state. Thus, the idea of enlisting Moslems into the local army was the best solution to all these troubles. Besides, their patriotism, when cultivated through the process of military training, could become a stabilizing factor for internal peace and security in Sinkiang.

Fifth, the Uighurs, the second largest racial group in Sinkiang, believed in the same Islam religion as the Moslem group, although their languages were different. Being a non-Chinese group, the attitude of the Uighurs towards the local administration and China as a whole was usually affected and molded by the Moslem group. Thus, the policy of recruiting Moslem troops into the military forces would also be a policy of keeping the Uighurs under control.⁹

Governor Yang's policy of keeping the Moslem troops in his military set-up later proved to be wise and far-reaching. It was this Moslem army that helped Yang Tseng-hsin in his campaigns against the secret society in Sinkiang, the Mongols' invasion of Kobdo, the trouble caused by the White Russian soldiers who retreated to Sinkiang after the October Revolution, and the disturbances caused by the Russian Kazakhs. All these events constituted significant milestones during Governor Yang's administration in Sinkiang and are worthy of careful scrutiny here.

I. THE PEACE BETWEEN THE ILI GOVERNMENT AND THE SINKIANG GOVERNMENT, AND THE UNIFICATION OF SINKIANG PROVINCE

Long before Yang Tseng-hsin took over the governorship of Sinkiang, Ili had proclaimed the independence and set up a revolutionary government under the leadership of Yang Tsan-hsü, Feng T'e-min, Feng Te-shu and others. At the end of the Manchu dynasty, Sinkiang was under the rule of Governor Yuan Ta-hua with its capital at Tihua (or Urumchi). In response to the revolutionary movement in China, a group of revolutionaries under the leadership of those mentioned above set up a new revolutionary government at Ili and prepared to take over the entire territory eventually. Consequently, war broke out between the revolutionary forces of Ili and the Manchu troops of Tihua.

Unfortunately the revolutionary movement in Sinkiang was suppressed by the Manchu-appointed governor, Yuan Ta-hua, although the revolution in the interior of China succeeded in 1911, and the Republic of China was formally established. Later when the Manchu governor, Yuan Ta-

⁹ Yang Tseng-hsin, *op. cit.*, V, I-A, pp. 5-6.

hua, realized that the tide had turned in favor of the revolution, he sought compromise and peace with the local revolutionary force at Ili. But, unfortunately, before he reached any agreement with the Ili group, Yuan was forced to resign, and the governor-designate, Yuan Hung-yu, was assassinated by agents of the secret society. Finally Yang Tseng-hsin was chosen; he became the first governor of Sinkiang province under the new régime of the Republic of China.¹⁰

As soon as his governorship was approved by the Peking Government, Yang Tseng-hsin took immediate steps to solve the Ili problem and thus to clarify the relationship between the Ili Government and the Sinkiang Provincial Government. As a result of a series of negotiations between the representatives of both sides, an agreement was finally reached and a peace treaty was signed at T'a-ch'eng in June, 1912. There were eleven articles in this treaty, the most important of which were:

1. Sinkiang province will pledge allegiance to the Republican régime in China and adhere to the principles of the republican constitution. All those who were engaged in revolutionary activities at Ili will be recognized as members of the Revolutionary Party.

2. Ili and Sinkiang are to be united on their foreign and domestic policies. All reconstruction programs is to be centered at, and undertaken by, the provincial Government at Ti-hua, the capital, which shall be recognized as the highest administrative and legislative organ. Both the Altai and T'a-ch'eng regions shall be placed under the jurisdiction of the province of Sinkiang.

3. With the unification of Ili and Sinkiang, administrative and executive power in the entire province shall be vested in the governor. Since the newly designated governor, Yang Tseng-hsin, has been officially approved by the President of the Republic of China, he shall be recognized by both parties and therefore given the full authority to direct the administrative affairs of the province. It is hoped that the Provincial Legislative Council will be duly set up and that election of its members can be conducted at the earliest possible time.

4. The administration of Sinkiang under the new governor is to be based upon the same system as other provinces in interior China.¹¹ However, special attention shall be given to Sinkiang and special organi-

¹⁰ Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-lueh hsi-yu k'ao* ("A History of Chinese Administration of the Western Regions") (Shanghai, 1936), pp. 483-489.

¹¹ The local government of interior China after the 1911 Revolution was based upon the Ch'ing system under which the provincial government was headed by a governor assisted by another military governor, with lower divisions of *tao* (circuit) commissioners and *hsien* (district) magistrates.

zations may be set up in Sinkiang in order to cope with such problems as may arise only in the border areas like this province.¹²

The importance of this agreement lies not only in that it solved the disputes and rivalry between the Revolutionary Government at Ili and the provincial government at Ti-hua, but also in that it paved the way for unification of the entire province under the leadership of Governor Yang. In order to consolidate political unity in Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin yielded a few important positions and gave them to the leaders of the former Ili government. For instance, General Yang Tsan-hsu, former commander of the Ili forces, was given the post of military-governor of Kashgar region; Ho Chia-tung, former commissioner for political affairs of the Ili government was appointed commissioner for political affairs in the Provincial Government; Feng T'e-min, former commissioner for foreign affairs in the Ili government, was appointed commissioner for foreign affairs in the Provincial Government of Sinkiang. Other leaders of the Ili group, such as Li Fu-huang, Feng Ta-shu and Kao K'o-chuang, were all given important positions in the Provincial Government.¹³ On the surface, Yang's policy of integrating former Ili officials into his own government may have appeared to be a good gesture towards harmony and unity in Sinkiang, but in reality, as Governor Yang himself indicated in his report to the Central Government, it aimed only at breaking down the revolutionary organization at Ili and thus obtaining full control of political power within his provincial government.¹⁴

The disputes between the Ili group and Yang Tseng-hsin, however, were not completely solved by the peace agreement and political appointments. Among the problems yet to be solved was the question of unifying the military command in Sinkiang. Governor Yang's attitude and hopes were revealed in the following letter he sent to one of the princes of the Mongolian Altai:

All the leaders of the Ili group have been given important positions in the Provincial Government. However, with regard to the military command, I do not think it advisable to use any Ili personnel. Though they may be able to get along with the military groups in Sinkiang, the military administration should be handled by the governor of the province according to the common practices in other provinces of the interior. Since the Ili group and I have no disputes on this matter, I do not think they will mind if I take this matter into my own hands. The situation in the border area is rather urgent. All of us should try our best to fulfill our duties and obligations, and not quarrel over our rights and privi-

¹² Yang, *op. cit.*, V, III-A, pp. 2-4.

¹³ Tseng, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

leges. If all my colleagues are as sincere and cooperative as you are, we shall still be able to save our border areas from danger and threat.¹⁵

Realizing that without the military command firmly held in his own hands he could not control the entire province, Yang Tseng-hsin had to take some drastic measures to strip the Ili group of all military power. The first step he took was to order the disbanding of the volunteers organized by the Ili group. Second, he removed the commanding officer of the Ili revolutionary forces, General Yang Tsan-hsu from his military duties by promoting him to the military-governorship of Kashgar; at the same time, he appointed General Kuang Fu, a Manchu, the new commanding officer of the Ili army, and concurrently commander of the Border Garrison at Ili. Third, he charged two leaders of the Ili group, Feng T'e-min and Li Fu-huang, with treason and thus sentenced them to death. Fourth, upon the unexpected death of the Manchu general, Kuang Fu, he appointed one of his close associates, General Yang Fei-hsia, the new commanding officer of the Ili army and thus completely re-organized that group.¹⁶ As a result of these measures, Governor Yang succeeded in putting the military forces of the whole province under his own control.

After the Ili question had finally been settled, Governor Yang's next move towards the unification of the Sinkiang province was directed at T'a-ch'eng, a territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the Ili government, and the Altai, an autonomous region which had hitherto been under the direct control of the former Manchu government. His policy with regard to T'a-ch'eng was to promote that area from "district" (*hsien*) to "circuit" (*tao*) and thus make its people happy. He sent a petition to the Central Government in Peking in which he explained the situation there. He said:

When Sinkiang was given the same status as other provinces in the interior, the Government appointed a civil governor to rule over both sides of the T'ien-shan mountains. For the Ili region, a general was appointed who was assisted by two deputy commanding officers, one stationed at the town of Hui-yuan in charge of the left flank of this region, and the other stationed at T'a-ch'eng in charge of its right flank but given the title of "counsellor" at the same time. When the Chinese Republic was established, the generalship at Ili was abolished and one of the deputy commanding officers changed to commander of the Border Garrison; thus the title of "counsellor" should also be eliminated . . . T'a-ch'eng is one of the important border cities. During recent years there has been marked progress and prosperity in that region along the O-min-le River.

¹⁵ Yang, *op. cit.*, V, III-A, pp. 8-9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-24.

On the northeast it is bordered by the main road in the Altai and also by Lake Zaisan,¹⁷ where Russian steamships are constantly being sent. Because of trade activities this town has become a very important center. For this reason this town and its area should be elevated from the present *hsien* (district) status to *tao* (circuit) status, and a commissioner should be seated there to supervise the magistrates of such districts as Wu-su, Sha-wan, and Shih-to-le-kai. In addition, the commissioner should also hold the title of deputy-commander so that he will be in a position to take care of the Mongols of that area. Such a necessary change, if approved, will also wipe out obstacles to unifying the administration of the entire province and thus assure unity in military, financial, internal and foreign affairs.¹⁸

This plan was immediately approved by the Central Government in Peking. Consequently the commissioner's office was set up in T'a-ch'eng and Wang Fu-jui was appointed to that office. Thus, since November, 1916, the T'a-ch'eng region has been under the direct control of the Sinkiang provincial government.

The next question was that of Altai autonomy. But opportunity did not avail itself to Governor Yang until November, 1918, when the ruling prince of the Altai autonomous region, a Mongol nobleman, petitioned the governor and asked for annexation of that region with the Sinkiang province. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Governor Yang petitioned the Central Government in Peking for immediate action on the annexation plan.¹⁹ The response of the Central authorities, particularly the State Council, however, was not in favor of such a plan. Anxious to have this knotty problem solved in order to unify his administration in Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin sent another long telegram to the Central Government to plead for such an action. His telegram read:

On the problem of the Kazakh people in the Altai region, we find that they are in the same situation as tribes residing in other parts of the province. The Kazakhs have settled down along the Russian-Sinkiang border region. The trouble with these people arises from the fact that they usually ignore the border line and the local administrations. Though the border between our country and Russia has been clearly defined, we often find that one Kazakh family has settled on both sides of the border. For this reason we have already set up a special district in Southern Sinkiang to meet with this kind of trouble caused by them. Since both Ili and T'a-ch'eng have been incorporated in this province, the Kazakhs living in that region have been under the administration of the Border Garrison and the Commissioner's office respectively. So far no trouble has been caused by these people there. In comparison more Kazakhs live in the Altai region than in Ili and T'a-ch'eng combined. If they could be put under

¹⁷ Lake Zaisan is situated north of T'a-ch'eng and is in the territory of Russia.

¹⁸ Yang, *op. cit.*, V, III-A, pp. 29-30.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

the same administration as Ili and T'a-ch'eng, we can almost assure ourselves that the trouble caused by Kazakhs in that area will be totally avoided.

No difficulty is anticipated regarding the control of the Altai region by the Provincial Government, should that region be placed under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. The city of Ch'eng-hua-ssu (in the Altai region) is about the same distance from the provincial capital, Ti-hua (or Urumchi), as Ili or T'a-ch'eng is. Yet postal and telegraphic services between the capital and those three cities have already been established with the city of Sui-lai as the relay center . . . If we feel no difficulty in communicating with either Ili or T'a-ch'eng, we will not have any difficulty in communicating with the Altai either.

The finances of the Altai region do not pose any problem either. In the past, revenues in this region came mainly from taxes levied on horses, other animals and furs. These should be continued without change. Our interest in the Altai does not lie in the financial advantages; we are primarily concerned with the convenience and unity of the provincial administration. If our proposal of reorganizing the Altai to the status of a circuit (*tao*) were based on the assumption that its financial income satisfies its needs, then some of the historical events of similar nature, such as the establishment of four cities²⁰ in Kansu during the Han dynasty, and even the elevation of Sinkiang from a territory to a province, would never have taken place. Actually, in the past, the Altai received an annual of \$200,000 from the Central Government. In the case of T'a-ch'eng, before its incorporation into Sinkiang, it received also the same amount of subsidy from the Central Government. But after its incorporation the subsidy was reduced by fifty to sixty per cent. If the Altai is annexed to Sinkiang province, the financial burden of the Central Government will also be greatly lightened.

As to the fear of increase of taxation in the Altai expressed by some people, it is actually without basis. During the past seven years under the Republican government, Sinkiang authorities did nothing either to disturb or harm the people. Should the Altai be incorporated into Sinkiang, the high officials in the provincial government, in their supervisory capacity, do not have either the right or the intent to exploit the Mongols or Kazakhs living in that region. If the local officials sent to the Altai should have intentions or designs to exploit the local people, then once found out, they will be undoubtedly punished by the higher authorities in the provincial government. It has been our basic principle and policy that the border people, regardless of their racial background, should be treated with kindness and fairness, for only by so doing can their loyalty to the Chinese government be won. It should be well remembered that when Ili was taken over by the provincial government, people of that region were exempted from paying 22,000 head of sheep as annual tax to the government, and that after T'a-ch'eng was incorporated, the annual tax of 400 horses was also canceled by the provincial government. The problem of subsidizing the Altai can be easily solved by careful handling of surplus incomes from other districts of the province. If the Altai should continue as an autonomous region, its present revenue certainly cannot meet its needs. If any emergency should

²⁰ The four cities established during the early Han dynasty were Chiu-ch'uan, Chang-yeh, Chu-yen and Hsiu-t'u.

arise in that region, not only the Central Government be asked for help, the provincial government of Sinkiang would also be requested to lend a helping hand. The memory of the incident of 1912 when the troops of Outer Mongolia invaded this area is still vivid in our minds.

The Altai has been established as an autonomous region for more than ten years now. But within the short period of ten years, the local administration has been changed five times. We cannot blame the officials for being incompetent; the Altai has its own geographical, financial and manpower limitations. In the past when Mongolia was still under our jurisdiction, cities in the neighborhood such as Ulan Bator, Uliasutai and Kobdo, had to be used as its protective outflanks. But now that all these cities are gone with Outer Mongolia's independence, the Altai becomes completely isolated. Both Russia on one side and Mongolia on the other are closely watching over the Altai with keen interest. Of the two powers, Russia is more ambitious and dangerous. Around the Altai on the other side of the Bulgin River, the Russians have already established a trading center and Russian merchants are constantly sailing down the river to trade with people in this region. In addition, the Russians have also stationed a group of soldiers down there tilling land and cutting trees, and thus have encroached upon our own interests and rights. They could do these things there because the Altai is isolated and remote. It was because of these and other reasons that the former commissioner, a Mongol prince, petitioned to incorporate the Altai into the province of Sinkiang.²¹

After clarifying the situation of the Altai to the Central authorities, Yang Tseng-hsin made further proposals and tentative plans regarding the incorporation and re-organization of the Altai. In his opinion, the entire Altai region should be placed under the direct control of the governor of Sinkiang, but under indirect supervision of a commissioner. The division of duties between the local administrator and the provincial authorities was also defined. The commissioner should be in charge of local tribal affairs, trade negotiations with the Russian consul at Altai, and other matters of local significance. The provincial government should have control of military affairs, such as the dispatching and rotation of troops in that area. However, the commissioner was also given authority to command the troops there. In conclusion, Governor Yang reiterated the importance of such a proposal:

In short, the subordination of the Altai to Sinkiang and the change of its status from that of a district to a circuit means an increase of burden and responsibility to the provincial government. Personally, I would rather avoid such a heavy responsibility. But the situation there has become so urgent that the future of the Altai should be a concern of the whole country. Sinkiang and the Altai are mutually dependent upon, and closely related to, each other. If the Altai should be in trouble, Sinkiang would also be involved in danger. It should be again remembered that without the help of Sinkiang, the Altai might

²¹ Yang, *op. cit.*, V, III-A, pp. 40-45.

have been lost to Outer Mongolia when the latter proclaimed its independence from China. The Altai is very important to the border defense of Sinkiang, but in turn it relies on Sinkiang for its own protection. This situation is clear to everyone in the country. For myself, I have no other choice but to adopt the policy outlined above.²²

Unfortunately when this telegram reached Peking, an uprising had occurred in the Altai region. The decision of the Central Government was thus delayed until the trouble was over. At long last, the proposal outlined by Yang Tseng-hsin was approved by the State Council in Peking, and the task of unifying the entire province designed by Yang was completed. As for the uprising caused by the tribes in the Altai, it will be discussed in the following sections.

II. THE SUPPRESSION AND ANNIHILATION OF THE SECRET SOCIETIES IN SINKIANG

When the Manchus conquered China and established the Ch'ing dynasty in 1644, secret societies began to function in China. Their primary purpose was to overthrow the Manchu government. During the reigns of Tao-kuang (1821-1851) and Hsien-feng (1851-1862) these societies spread all over China, assuming different names in different areas. Those in the south along the Pearl River valley were called the *San-ho-hui* (Triad), and those along the Yangtse River valley named themselves the *Ko-lao-hui* (Brothers and Elders Society) or the *Ko-ti-hui* (Brotherhood Society). The activities of these secret groups were concentrated primarily in the interior of China. During the later period of the Ch'ing dynasty when General Tso Tsung-t'ang²³ was sent to suppress the Moslem rebellion in Sinkiang, his troops brought these secret societies with them into that area. The man who initiated the Sinkiang branches was named K'un-chan, a commanding officer of the Manchu garrison at Pa-li-kun. In 1912 when the revolutionary forces in Sinkiang struck and plotted to seize the capital, Ti-hua, nearly all the soldiers taking part in that campaign were members of the secret society. Unfortunately the revolution in Sinkiang failed, and many of the revolutionary forces surrendered to the local Manchu authorities. These men were then placed in different garrisons located at such strategic places as Yen-chi, K'u-ch'a and Aksu. The Manchu-appointed governor at that time, Yuan Ta-hua, appointed one

²² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²³ For General Tso Tsung-t'ang, see footnote 7, cited above.

of their leaders by the name of T'an Ch'ang-ku to take charge of these troops stationed in southern Sinkiang. Thus the south became the breeding ground of these secret societies.²⁴

In 1912, when the Ili revolution started, the leader of the Ko-lao-hui in that region, Hsu San-t'ai, reorganized his group as the *Hsin-min-shan*, naming himself chief and Yang Tsan-hsu deputy. Thus, Ili became a Ko-lao-hui center, preaching the doctrine of brotherhood and mutual help. Meanwhile, in the interior of China, the Revolutionary Party allied itself with the secret societies. Consequently, secret societies mushroomed and flourished all over China, like weeds in the fields.

In Sinkiang the Ko-lao-hui took part in both the Ili and the Ti-hua revolutions. But after these "revolutionary" movements all failed, their members moved to the southern part of Sinkiang and began their agitations in the localities mentioned above. From then on, the main pattern of their activities was to disturb the peace and to assassinate local officials. Unable to handle the situation within the territory, Governor Yuan was forced to resign his office. When Yang Tseng-hsin took over the governorship in 1912, the situation in the south had almost reached the point of lawlessness. In order to restore law and order and to bring unity within the entire province, Governor Yang first had to cope with the secret groups. The following cases as related by Governor Yang himself in his memoirs reveal the seriousness of the situation and the measures which Yang's administration used to tackle these troubles.

(1) *The Yen-ch'i case*

This case involved the assassination of the magistrate of Yen-ch'i in southern Sinkiang. It happened at a banquet given by the local garrison commander, Wu Shou-huai, in honor of Wang Hsueh-tseng, newly-appointed Commissioner for the Circuit of Kashgar. When the party had just begun, six members of the Ko-lao-hui headed by Lien Chun-ch'uan forced their way into the dining hall and killed the magistrate, Chang Hsien, and another official of the local office. The new commissioner and others escaped death by hiding in the stable. After the assassination, these men hoisted a white flag over the local government site, looted the treasury, opened the jail and released all eighteen prisoners there. Later, they seized the official seal of the local magistracy and forced Wu Shou-huai, the garrison commander, to take it over. When Wu refused to take it, they then turned it over to Wang, the new commissioner of Kashgar.

²⁴ Cf. Tseng, *op. cit.*, pp. 498-499.

At the same time they demanded: (1) that the Provincial Government appoint their leaders to high positions; (2) that the local garrison commander use their men as officers in the army; (3) that Commissioner Wang take care of their group (headed by Lien Chun-ch'uan). If these terms were not met, they would take over the official seal and the local administration. Commissioner Wang was confronted with a very difficult proposition, but finally yielded to their demands for the sake of peace and order. When the assassination took place, all the government troops under Wu's command were stationed outside the city. A small group of Moslem soldiers commanded by An I-yuan was stationed in the city, but it was not strong enough to cope with the secret society mob. Ten days after the assassination, Wang Hsueh-tseng was also appointed concurrently the magistrate of Su-le. Commander Wu gave a party in honor of Wang and invited all the leaders of the Ko-lao-hui to come. A plan had been secretly hatched beforehand at this time for getting rid of these men at the party. Commander Wu and the Moslem officer An I-yuan had reinforced their troops inside the city. When the Ko-lao-hui leaders came to the party, they were immediately arrested and executed on the spot. With their leaders eliminated, the secret society in that area was wiped out.²⁵

(2) *The Kucha case*

This case involved also an assassination of the magistrate of this city by the members of the Ko-lao-hui. On March 18, 1912, Ma Ying-wei, the magistrate of Kucha, was murdered by the Ko-lao-hui with Chung Kuan-hua as the chief instigator. The case was complicated because two local military leaders were behind it. One was T'an Ch'ang-ku, acting garrison commander of Kucha, and the other was Ch'en K'un-lin, a captain in the cavalry of the local army. Although all the assassins were executed by Governor Yang, he had to take a rather cautious attitude towards these two army officers. In his report to the Central Government, Yang gave a clear explanation of his attitude:

As we recall, on the tenth day of the third month of the third year of Hsuan-t'ung (1911) at the end of the Manchu régime, the soldiers' uprising was put down by the former governor, Yuan Ta-hua, who took the surrendered soldiers, members of the secret society, together with one of their leaders, T'an Ch'ang-ku, and sent them to the cities in southern Sinkiang as reserves in the army there. The root of disturbances in southern Sinkiang was thus planted . . . When the news of the revolt of the cavalry at Kucha reached Aksu, the garrison commander at Aksu, General Ch'a Ch'un-hua, sent his deputy, T'an Ch'ang-ku, to suppress

²⁵ Yang, *op. cit.*, V, II-A, pp. 39-46.

the uprising at Kucha. Instead of putting down the revolt, T'an himself joined forces with the rebels and plotted the assassination of the local magistrate. Then the commanding officer of the local troops was forced to resign, and T'an was appointed the acting commanding officer of Kucha by Ch'a Ch'un-hua. Although T'an never openly confessed plotting to murder the magistrate, he did many other unlawful things at Kucha with the cooperation of the rebels. His misconduct was loudly complained of by the local populace. Beyond any doubt T'an was a very important figure in the local Ko-lao-hui. With the local magistrate eliminated and the power in the hands of T'an Ch'ang-ku, Kucha had virtually become a center of the secret society. Kucha is a very important trading center for both the British and Russian merchants. For the sake of peace and order, I have to be very cautious and careful in dealing with these bandits. Finally, in the winter of 1913, I sent government troops to Kucha and removed the command of T'an Ch'ang-ku. But since T'an is a very dangerous man in the Ko-lao-hui, it would be unsafe to allow him to remain in the province here. I therefore request that he should be sent back to his native Hunan province and put under surveillance by the local officials there.²⁶

The reason that Governor Yang did not ask for any severe punishment of T'an Ch'ang-ku can be clearly understood. With members of the secret society widespread all over Sinkiang, any harsh punishment of their leaders might again agitate further disturbances and troubles. However, Yang's determination to completely annihilate of the Ko-lao-hui was never softened or compromised. As a matter of fact, neither T'an Ch'ang-ku nor other leaders of the secret society was able to leave the territory of Sinkiang. All of them were secretly executed by the order of Yang Tseng-hsin. After the Kucha case was cleared, Governor Yang appointed one of his trusted Moslem officers, Ma Shao-wu to be the new commanding officer of the local troops at Kucha and another member in the Provincial Council to be the new magistrate of that district.²⁷

(3) *The Kashgar case*

Of all the troubles caused by the Ko-lao-hui in Sinkiang, this case was, perhaps, the most notorious one, for it involved the Kashgar Commissioner, Yuan Hung-yu and his wife, together with two other officials. The significance of this case can be readily seen from the fact that Yuan Hung-yu was the governor-designate to succeed the former Yuan Ta-hua. Though the murder was another outrageous act done by the secret society, its background, however, was rather complicated. From the records of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin, the following details about this case were revealed. When the news of the founding of the Republic of China

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-56.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

reached the remote regions of Sinkiang through the cable communications of the Russian consulate, Commissioner Yuan Hung-yu in Kashgar refused to recognize the new government and continued to sign his papers in the name of the Manchu dynasty. Even when the official notice sent by the late governor Yuan Ta-hua came to Kashgar, the Commissioner still ignored it. His attitude brought great suspicion and complaint from both the local populace and the foreign consuls. Later when fighting between the revolutionary Ili Government and the Sinkiang territory was waged, Commissioner Yuan secretly increased taxes in Kashgar and sent money to aid the territorial authorities at Ti-hua. But when the Manchu-appointed governor finally resigned and recommended the Commissioner to succeed him, Commissioner Yuan not only accepted the offer without any hesitation, but even took a further step by ordering the people within his jurisdiction to cut their long queues and to change their Manchu costume. The local populace were not ready to take such a drastic move, and consequently great unrest and suspicion was brewed. Members of the secret Ko-lao-hui took advantage of this situation and murdered the Commissioner and his associates in cold blood.²⁸

The Military Governor for this region, Chiao Ta-shu, immediately sent troops to keep order and protect the lives and property of the foreign community. In the meantime, the newly-appointed commissioner for Kashgar, Wang Ping-kun, took over the office and warned the rebels not to harm the foreigners in this area. The rebels agreed not to spread their trouble any further but demanded that all their men involved should be given a chance to join the local army. Realizing the potential power and danger of the secret society, Military Governor Chiao accepted their demand and reorganized the members of the secret group into two regiments commanded by two of their leaders, Wei Te-hsi and Pien Yung-fu. Thus peace and order were restored in Kashgar and lives and properties of the foreign community were safeguarded. Later when revolts were reported in Pa-chu, these two Ko-lao-hui regiments were ordered to quell the trouble there. They went to Pa-chu and killed the rebel leader. As a result, these two Ko-lao-hui leaders, Wei Te-hsi and Pien Yung-fu, became very powerful and influential in all of southern Sinkiang.²⁹

Governor Yang realized that in order to crush the bad influence of the secret society in this area, these two men must be first eliminated. Aware of their potential influence over the members of the Ko-lao-hui, Yang had to exercise great caution. This is what he did: First of all, in order not

²⁸ *Ibid.*, V, II-B, p. 35.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

to cause any suspicion on the part of these notorious leaders, Governor Yang Tseng-hsin petitioned the Central Government to give a full pardon to these two men for whatever they had done. He based his argument upon the distinction between the activities these two had done before the founding of the Republic and activities they did afterwards. In his reasoning, Yang regarded the uprisings and revolts before the Republic as "revolutionary activities" and therefore legitimate. But the same kind of activities after the establishment of the Republic was considered banditry, and therefore illegitimate. In his opinion, the assassination of the governor-designate Yuan Hung-yu by the members of the secret society was legitimate and therefore those who were involved in this case should be pardoned. In his own words, Governor Yang said in his petition to the Peking Government:

Any uprisings before the establishment of the Republic should be considered as legitimate actions of the revolutionary party. But after the founding of the Republic, these uprisings should be regarded as unlawful and as acts of banditry. This definition is very clear and therefore should not be misunderstood. From the reports on the murder of the late governor-designate, it is clear that some of his misdeeds were not too important, such as his signing of documents in the name of the Ch'ing regime, increasing the local taxes, ordering the people to cut their hair and to change their costumes. But when he purposely ignored the official proclamation of the Republic, he should be held responsible for his disloyal action. His assassination by Wei and Pien and other members of the local Ko-lao-hui, though committed after the founding of the Republic, actually took place before the official announcement of the establishment of the Republic by the provincial authorities. This action, like so many other actions made by the revolutionary party before, should be regarded lawful and legitimate. Besides, all the participants willingly submitted themselves for military service afterwards. Peace and order were preserved and lives and property of the foreign community were never touched. Thus the motive of this assassination was revolutionary, and it should be distinguished from the acts of banditry.³⁰

When Governor Yang finally succeeded in getting a full pardon for these men from the Central Government, he took a second step towards getting rid of these powerful yet undesirable leaders of the secret society by moving them from the center of their organization and activities. It so happened that the Kobdo incident had just occurred, in which the border of Sinkiang was seriously threatened by invading Mongols.³¹ Taking this opportunity, Governor Yang ordered Wei and Pien together with their two regiments to be dispatched to the border area near Kobdo.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ For a detailed discussion on the invasion of Sinkiang by the Mongols, see the next section of this paper. (p.o).

With this done, Yang Tseng-hsin had actually accomplished two things: First, he took these two men away from Kashgar where the activities of the Ko-lao-hui were most serious and powerful. Second, when the assassination took place, the Russian government sent its troops over to the district of Kashgar to protect the lives and property of their merchants. But when law and order were restored, the Russian troops still remained there because, as they claimed, although order had been restored, the ringleaders still were active in that region. When Wei and Pien were finally sent away, Yang was also able to get the Russian troops out of Sinkiang.

The opportunity for Governor Yang to eliminate these two men finally came when the son of the late Commissioner Yuan brought suit against them. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin discharged Wei and Pien from their military service and tried them in a civil court, punishing them by sending them back to their native towns. The Ko-lao-hui trouble at Kashgar was finally brought to an end.³²

(4) *The Ts'e-le case*

Of all the murders committed by the Ko-lao-hui members, this case at Ts'e-le was perhaps a unique one because it involved not Chinese officials, but Russian merchants residing in this area. Ts'e-le is a village located in the district of Yu-tan in south Sinkiang where many foreigners including Russians lived. When the Revolution broke out in the interior of China, violence also occurred in this village in 1912, resulting in the death of many Russians. The background of this accident was as follows: by virtue of an agreement signed between the Russian government and the Ch'ing court, Russian merchants enjoyed the right of trading in this area and residing there without paying taxes. But this privilege was abused by the Russian consul at Ts'e-le, who lured local Moslems into becoming naturalized Russian subjects so as not to pay taxes to the Chinese authorities. As a result, many people, mostly Moslems, became Russians, or obtained trading permits from the Russian consulate. The number of these people increased at the time of turmoil. Taking advantage of their newly acquired privileges, these Moslems often provoked injustices and other insults upon their own people. Consequently, the local Moslem population blamed the Russians for all the trouble. The members of the Ko-lao-hui sided with the local Moslems in opposition to the naturalized Moslems. Violence finally broke out between these two groups, and

³² Yang, *op. cit.*, V, II-B, p. 38.

fighting ensued. As a result, two Chinese Moslems were killed, and 28 naturalized Moslems died.

Notwithstanding efforts on the part of the local Commissioner Wang Ping-kun to keep the incident from spreading, the Russian government sent 500 soldiers to Kashgar and surrounded the Commissioner's Office with machine-guns. At the same time, the Russian government launched a formal protest with the Central Government at Peking demanding: (1) a formal apology; (2) punishment of the instigators of the violence; and (3) compensation. Having accepted all these demands, President Yuan Shih-k'ai of the Central Government appointed the Military Governor of this area, General Yang Tsan-hsu, to negotiate locally with the Russian commander for a speedy withdrawal of their troops. General Yang Tsan-hsu arrived in Kashgar in January, 1913, and immediately entered negotiations with the Russians there. The Russian consul further demanded that all the participants in the violence and all the leading citizens should be executed, and that the compensation should be paid on the same basis as the Boxer indemnity. Meanwhile he instructed the Russian troops at Kashgar to prepare for war. The members of the local Ko-lao-hui were strongly opposed to any punishment of the Chinese and to any compensation of the Russian government. The situation became very tense and explosive.

General Yang Tsan-hsu's approach to this matter was rather clever. While still negotiating with the Russian authorities, he secretly rounded up several thousand civilians and gave them quick but fundamental military training. One day when negotiations had been resumed, General Yang invited the Russian consul to review his recently organized troops. When his extemporized army was called upon to march before the Russian consul, the Russian consul was astonished to see the huge Chinese army. Realizing their comparatively inferior strength, the Russians began to make concessions in their negotiations. Finally an agreement was reached - that all who participated in the violence were to be given prison terms or hard labor punishment and that two thousand rubles were to be paid to each victim. Thus the Ts'e-le case, which might have developed into more serious complications, was settled peacefully. The Russian soldiers evacuated from the Kashgar area.³³

There were other cases in southern Sinkiang involving the secret society, which one by one were solved by Governor Yang Tseng-hsin. As a result, the power and influence of the Ke-lao-hui were considerably reduced. After three years of continued effort from 1912 to 1914, Gover-

³³ Cf. Tseng, *op. cit.*, pp. 502-504.

nor Yang finally succeeded in stamping out all the Ko-lao-hui organizations in Sinkiang.

III. THE MOSLEM UPRISINGS IN SINKIANG

Another grave problem which faced Governor Yang Tseng-hsin's administration in Sinkiang was the constant Moslem uprisings. Sinkiang is a rather unique area characterized by ethnic diversity and plurality. With many races living together and with the Chinese as the ruling minority, disputes between racial groups and discontents among them were common phenomena. Among the various racial groups, the Moslems seemed to be the most troublesome one, starting many revolts in that area during Governor Yang's administration. The following stories of Moslem revolts, as recorded by Governor Yang in his official documents, tell both the backgrounds of these revolts and the policies adopted by Yang's administration.

(1) *The Moslem uprising at Ha-mi (Kumul)*

There was a long historical and rather complicated background in connection with the Ha-mi revolt. The hidden cause can be traced back to the time when an old Moslem prince named Mohammed (Mai-ha-mu-t'e) died during the reign of Kuang-hsu (1875-1908) of the Ch'ing dynasty. As the old prince did not have a son to succeed him, the leadership went to a nephew of his wife, Shah Mahasud (Ma-ha-su-te). Most of the Moslems did not approve of this arrangement. Later, when they suffered cruelty under this new prince, they revolted against him. In 1907, the population of this Moslem town stormed into the Moslem palace and sealed the palace gate with bricks they had brought with them. This was the year when Yang Tseng-hsin first came to Sinkiang from the neighboring Kansu province to take his post as the newly appointed High Commissioner for Aksu. He was immediately instructed by the governor to settle the trouble on the spot. Yang Tseng-hsin persuaded the Moslem prince to make certain concessions to his people, and the trouble was temporarily settled.³⁴

Unfortunately the Manchu-appointed governor, Yuan Ta-hua, later took the Ha-mi rebellion into his own hands. He arrested eight Moslem leaders in the revolt and executed them at the capital, Ti-hua. The Governor's action ignited fresh agitation and protest among the Moslems, and a second uprising was engineered opposing the Chinese leadership. Governor Yuan instructed the commanding general of the Chinese army at Chen-hsi, I Sheng-fu, to suppress the revolt. General I dealt with the

revolt with force and killed many Moslems. To avenge such a murderous act, the Moslems assassinated the general himself. As a result, the entire Ha-mi area was involved in a tragic tumult.

The incident occurred in 1912 when Yang Tseng-hsin took over the governorship of Sinkiang. Knowing fully and personally the cause of the Moslem revolt at Ha-mi, Governor Yang attempted to solve this rebellion by peaceful negotiations, not by force. In a letter addressed to the Moslem prince, Yang analyzed the cause of the revolt and offered his solutions, including the following points:

First, the revolt of the Moslems was directed at abolishing the military services imposed upon them. If military service is either reduced or totally eliminated, the revolt can be easily settled. Second, the Moslem rebels who fled to the mountains are still at large. As long as this situation lasts, continuous trouble is to be expected, involving not only the local people but also the whole province. Third, Ha-mi is very close to Mongolia. If the local trouble cannot be settled in a peaceful manner, it might offer a golden opportunity to the ambitious Mongols. Should the Mongols join force with the local Moslem rebels, greater disaster would result. Fourth, military suppression of the revolt is not only inhuman but also contradictory to the principle of republicanism on which the Republic of China has been built. Fifth, the rebels in Mongolia have already shown their intentions of driving into our territory. Thus, our border defense has become a matter of urgency more than ever before. A speedy and peaceful solution to the Ha-mi question would bring more concentrated effort to our border defense. Lastly, should we insist upon military suppression of the revolt, then more soldiers will be required and increased supplies needed. This means more burden on the local people. But to settle this problem by peaceful means will undoubtedly lighten the burden of the people and alleviate their sufferings.³⁵

Governor Yang's persuasion finally prevailed, and all parties involved in the Ha-mi revolt agreed to settle the question peacefully. Chang Ts'ai-t'ing, a captain in the army, was sent by Governor Yang to Ha-mi as his representative to negotiate with the revolting Moslems for a truce. But, as Chang was not able to reach the rebel leader, Temür (T'ieh-mu-erh), Yang Tseng-hsin sent another man by the name of Li Shou-fu to Ha-mi to reach an agreement with the Moslems. At last, an agreement was signed between the rebels and the Sinkiang authorities. The terms were: (a) that the military service required of the Moslems to their ruling prince was reduced from three to two days a month; (b) that the rebellious group under Temür was to be re-organized into a special garrison with Temür as the commanding officer stationed at Ti-hua (Urumchi). Thus the Moslem revolt at Ha-mi was brought to an end.³⁶

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 509.

³⁵ Yang, *op. cit.*, V, II-A, p. 14.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1-11.

(2) *The Moslem rebellion at Kucha*

The leader of the Moslem group at Kucha was named Mametelli Khan (Mai-mai-t'ieh-li Han) who claimed to be a descendant of Yakub Beg, a well-known rebel leader of the Moslems during the reign of T'ung-chih of the Ch'ing dynasty (1863-1881). Mametelli Khan preached hatred to his fellow Moslems against the Chinese. Having obtained a trading permit from the local British consulate, he pretended to be a British subject. In 1918, he began to make trouble. Leading a group of Moslems, he attacked the town of Kucha and set fire to a number of houses. His attack was met with strong resistance by the defenders of that city, and as a result, the uprising was crushed by the local authorities. Mametelli Khan and his men retreated to the nearby mountains. Later, he and five other leaders were all killed.

Some of the followers of Mametelli Khan were also rounded up and executed in Kucha. To uproot the causes of trouble from the district, Governor Yang further instructed the local magistrate of Kucha to do everything possible to prevent recurrence of such incidents in the future. In the meantime, he sent an official note to the British consul at Kashgar through the Office of the High Commissioner expressing his appreciation for the British consul's understanding and cooperation in this case. General notices were also circulated in that region urging the populace to obey law and order and not to be easily swayed by rumors or agitations. Thus the Kucha incident was quickly brought to an end in July, 1918.³⁷

(3) *The soldiers' revolt in the Altai in 1919*

A much more serious uprising than the Moslem revolts confronting the administration of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin was the soldiers' uprising of 1919, the eight year of the Republic. The immediate cause of this uprising was the dismissal of an army captain named Feng Chi-jan. But the underlying cause of this incident had a close relationship to the corruption of the officials of the Altai region.

The Altai was a region poor in natural resources, agriculture and industry. With respect to political appointments, the Altai was never an attractive place where officials cared to be sent. Those sent there had no interest in the local administration. Their only interest was to make personal gains. Over the years, corrupt officials had followed two main practices to achieve personal gains: they either imposed increased taxation upon

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-67.

the local population, particularly the Mongolian people, or they could make a false report to the provincial government on the total number of soldiers stationed there. Besides, these officials were also given the authority to issue paper money in their region. All these evil practices and devices could make the local officials corrupt and greedy.

The soldiers' uprising at Altai in 1918 was caused by the failure of the government to pay the local soldiers their salary for more than five months. Unhappy and dissatisfied, the soldiers assembled one day at the gate of the Office of the High Commissioner and demanded their salary. Mistaking the soldiers for a mob, the guards of the High Commissioner's Office opened fire and killed three of the petitioning soldiers. Enraged by the outrageous action of the guards, the soldiers stormed into the office, seized the High Commissioner, Chang Ch'ing-t'ung, and put him under custody. Then, under the leadership of Feng Chi-jan, the soldiers proclaimed independence and took over the local administration. The local merchants, fearing the potential seriousness and disaster in this incident, voluntarily offered their help by loaning the soldiers three months salary. This action on the part of the local merchants saved the Altai from further disturbance.

When the report on the soldiers' uprising at Altai reached Governor Yang Tseng-hsin he immediately wired to the Central Government at Peking for instruction. In the meantime, he sent Chou Wu-hsueh, Commissioner for military affairs in the provincial government, to Altai, and alerted several regiments of infantry and cavalry stationed at nearby Ku-ch'eng and Sui-lai for emergency.

This incident occurred just at the time when Governor Yang had suggested to the Central Government that the Altai should be made an integral part of Sinkiang province, instead of an autonomous region. When this uprising happened, Yang took this opportunity to press the Central Government for a speedy and favorable decision on his proposal. So when he sent troops to Altai, he cabled the following to Peking authorities:

There are several reasons for my sending troops to the Altai region. First of all, though the local authorities of Altai claimed that they had a thousand soldiers (in each unit), actually they had only two or three hundred. Besides, the army there had some undesirable elements such as members of the Ko-lao hui (secret society). Whenever an uprising occurred, these elements were always ready to lend a hand. Second, the Altai is a pasture for the Kazakh people residing in Mongolia. The Chinese in this area are often regarded as "guests." The Kazakhs are wild, unruly and known for their skill in stealing and looting. The rebellion may provide them with an opportunity to disturb other people

living in the area. Third, there are also Russian merchants and their consul residing in Altai. The Russian troops sent there to protect the lives and property of their own people were only recently called back to Russia because of the revolution. If members of the secret society should choose this time to make trouble with the Russians, grave consequences may result. Fourth, in the nearby Zaisan region in Russia, a number of Chinese outlaws are hiding. It is only a day's journey from there to Altai. Should the rebels ask help from this group of outlaws, the incident could develop into something uncontrollable. Fifth, the local army in Altai is well equipped with guns and cannons. Should the revolting soldiers decide to use these weapons to spread their uprising elsewhere, more disastrous results could be produced. Today they may loot the cities, tomorrow they may loot the countryside and pastures. Today they may plunder within the Altai, tomorrow they may plunder the whole border area. And if they should become roaming bandits from now on, it would be impossible to keep them under control. Lastly, ever since Outer Mongolia became independent, all Mongols in the Altai, except the group headed by Prince Ni, have had some contacts with Ulan Bator (capital of Outer Mongolia). If the Altai incident cannot be solved to our satisfaction, then before long the Mongolian government may stir up their people in this region for more trouble. Once the Mongolian tribes join forces with Ulan Bator, the entire Altai situation would become utterly uncontrollable. For these reasons I cannot sit idly by without being concerned with what is happening in Altai. But because the Ili situation is also urgent at the present, I can only send several regiments of troops from nearby Ku-ch'eng and Sui-lai.³⁸

When Chou Wu-hsueh together with some troops arrived at Altai, he immediately took over the office as acting High Commissioner for the Altai. After some investigation, he reported the following story to the governor: Feng Chi-jan, the army captain, together with two other army officers, Tu Hai-shun, the deputy commanding officer of the cavalry, and Mu Teng-o, a regiment leader, were held responsible for the uprising of March 7, 1918. The rebels looted the local government office, took supplies from the ammunition warehouse, released all prisoners and killed three junior officials. The High Commissioner fled, but was later seized by the rebels. Then Feng assumed leadership and appointed Tu the commander of all troops and Mu his chief-of-staff. He forced the High Commissioner to hand over the official seal and ordered the department head of general affairs to keep things going as usual. The local merchants offered help by loaning money to pay the soldiers. In return, they demanded law and order for this area.

On May 14, 1918, the day when Chou Wu-hsueh arrived at Altai, he immediately arranged to meet with the three rebel leaders. Two days later, Chou learned that the rebels had all moved into the houses of local

³⁸ *Ibid.*, V, II-C, pp. 54-55.

merchants. He suspected that the soldiers might plan a new move. Chou realized that he had to take drastic steps in order to prevent any further complications. Thus, he called the three leaders again for a second conference. As soon as the three rebels entered the office premises, Chou ordered them seized and shot to death on the spot. With their leaders gone, the rest of the soldiers were easy to handle. In the name of the Acting High Commissioner, Chou put out a public proclamation to restore law and order in Altai. The soldiers' revolt was thus put to an end.³⁹

Governor Yang Tseng-hsin took care of rehabilitations for the Altai. He petitioned Peking to transfer the appropriations for the Altai to the Sinkiang Provincial Government and used it for paying back the merchants' loan and helping victims in this incident. He appointed Chou Wu-hsueh as the new High Commissioner for the Altai, and placed all the tribes including the Mongols under direct control of the Commissioner. Not only was the uprising satisfactorily pacified, the autonomous status of the Altai was also dissolved as Yang Tseng-hsin had hoped.⁴⁰

IV. THE MONGOL INVASION OF SINKIANG

In the same year in which the Nationalist Revolution was successfully concluded in China (1911), Outer Mongolia also won her independence from China. Next year, troops of Outer Mongolia invaded Kobdo, an area bordering Sinkiang and Mongolia, and an autonomous region ruled directly by the Central Government of China. This invasion caused a great deal of alarm to Sinkiang and Governor Yang Tseng-hsin, because of the adjacency of Kobdo to the Altai and other border areas of Sinkiang.

During the Ch'ing dynasty, the region of Kobdo was ruled by an official sent by the Manchu court. The region, being primarily pasture land, was settled by eighteen Mongolian groups ("banners"). The status of Kobdo remained the same after the Republic of China was established. When the invasion of the Mongols occurred, the Counsellor of Kobdo immediately reported the incident to Peking and asked for help. President Yuan Shih-k'ai instructed both the High Commissioner of the Altai and Governor Yang of Sinkiang to send troops to help defend Kobdo.

The Kobdo incident, according to one contemporary writer, also had international significance behind it. The plot of the Mongol invasion had

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-62.

reportedly been tailored by the Tsarist government of Russia, which envisioned a gigantic empire encompassing the territories of Mongolia and Sinkiang.⁴¹

When the Mongols attacked Kobdo, Governor Yang Tseng-hsin was busily engaged in suppressing the secret societies in southern Sinkiang and therefore was unable to spare any of his troops to help defend Kobdo. The only area from where troops might be dispatched was Ku-ch'eng (also called Ch'i-t'ai), located in the northeastern part of the province. Thus, he ordered the magistrate of that city to send a regiment of soldiers to Kobdo, and at the same time, to recruit another cavalry regiment of 128 men. In addition, he managed to send two regiments from the capital, Ti-hua, including 50 men from the artillery unit. It was estimated that about 1,000 soldiers were rushed to Kobdo.⁴²

One of the main problems which Governor Yang had to face in aiding Kobdo was that of supplies. Along the route from Ku-ch'eng to Kobdo, there were ten stations where water and other necessities except food could be obtained. Realizing the urgent need for food supplies, Yang ordered the magistrate of Ku-ch'eng to organize a supply team of two hundred camels carrying food along that route for the soldiers.

With all these problems solved, Governor Yang's preparations were made for war against the invading Mongols. But at the same time, he did not lose hope of meeting the situation in peaceful ways. First he sent the Mongols printed leaflets in which he tried to talk them out of invading Kobdo. The text of the leaflet read as follows:

Now the Chinese government has been established on the basis of a republic under which all peoples – Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans – enjoy equal treatment and rights. In comparison with the former dynasty, under which minorities were often oppressed, the present government in Peking has certainly adopted different policies and attitudes. Unfortunately the Living Buddha (Hutuktu) of Mongolia has failed to understand this tremendous change in the Chinese government and consequently he was fooled by others from outside into starting war with China. How happy you were when you enjoyed a peaceful life in your tents, eating mutton, drinking creamed tea and worshipping your Buddha! Now you have to suffer from the disaster of war and privation. As the governor of Sinkiang province, I take pity on your ignorance. I am now sending my soldiers to Kobdo to protect your lives and property. We will also try to protect the Chinese and Russian merchants residing and trading there. If you promise to live there peacefully as you have done before, making no trouble, not looting, not fighting against the government, and willing to be governed by the High Official sent there by the Central Government, you will

⁴¹ Cf. Tseng, *op. cit.*, p. 513.

⁴² Yang, *op. cit.*, V, V-A, pp. 1-5.

continue to enjoy peace and harmony as you did before. But if you fail to heed my advice and throw yourselves into war, you must bear the consequences.⁴³

When the Russian consul at Ti-hua learned that the Sinkiang authorities had sent troops to help Kobdo, he lodged a strong protest with the governor, warning him that sending reinforcements to Kobdo would seriously affect Sino-Russian relations. In reply, Governor Yang told the Russian consul that "Kobdo is a territory of China under the jurisdiction of the President of the Republic of China. Since trouble has started in that area, the President has instructed me to send troops to Kobdo. This is entirely an internal affair of China and has no bearing whatsoever upon our neighboring countries."⁴⁴ Knowing the intentions of the Russian consul and his government, Governor Yang reminded the Central Government at Peking to warn the Russians to keep their hands off Kobdo.

Unfortunately before the reinforcements reached Kobdo, the Mongols had already occupied the region on August 20 of the same year. Governor Yang sent the following report to Peking explaining the delay of the reinforcements and their failure to save Kobdo:

Having received instructions from the Central Government to send troops to defend Kobdo, I found the area had been taken by the Mongols. It is, therefore, my duty to present the Government with a full account of the entire incident.

Between Ku-ch'eng and Yuan-hu in the Chi-tai district, there are only three stations where the troops can stop and rest. From there on to Kobdo there are 13 stations, but the distance between stations is sometimes more than two hundred *li*. It took the troops 17 or 18 stops before they could reach Kobdo. Furthermore, the entire route was surrounded by desert. The soldiers could not stop for rest until they found water and grass, and they could only find water and grass at one of those stations. Even when they finally reached a station, they had to dig out the well before they could find water. This is the main reason for their delay.

In the area inhabited by the Mongols no food could be obtained for our soldiers. Between Ku-ch'eng and the Mongolian border there is nothing but desert, therefore no food stations could be established. Thus, camels had to be used to carry supplies for both the infantry and cavalry units. Each camel could carry only three months supply for one soldier. In order to provide proper supplies for those troops we had to mobilize a large number of camels. But it was simply impossible to get hold of so many camels at one time in this province. This is another reason for the delay.

Most of the troops were sent from Chen-si and Ha-mi, in the eastern part of the province. The troops stationed at the provincial capital were small in number. When I received the Government instructions to send help to Kobdo, I had to recruit a new cavalry unit at Ku-ch'eng and to make use of a Moslem

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

regiment there. When these units were ready to go, I received a telegram from the High Commissioner of Kobdo on July 15. He said, "I am very grateful for your reinforcement of two cavalry regiments to help us here. But the food supply at Ku-ch'eng is even more difficult than at Kobdo. Fortunately the troops from the Altai have arrived here and the situation has been much improved. Therefore I request that the regiment from Ku-ch'eng be sent to Kobdo, but that the Moslem unit be stationed at Ku-ch'eng for the time being. When I get to Kobdo and investigate the situation there, I will send you another telegram regarding the movement of that regiment." Later I received another telegram from the High Commissioner from Altai suggesting that the troops should go to Altai to join with him and then proceed to Kobdo together. By the time this telegram came, the two regiments from Ku-ch'eng had already reached a place called Cha-han-tung-ku inside Mongolia. But because these troops were "guests", the local authorities had to be consulted, regarding their moves. These consultations caused the delay.

The subsidy of the Central Government to Sinkiang province has been suspended for some time. Sinkiang's budget has been temporarily supported by the issuance of banknotes. When Southern Sinkiang was disturbed by the secret societies, all revenues from those districts were interrupted for two years. By the time the Kobdo incident occurred in August, the provincial government of Sinkiang had received only about 30,000 taels (in silver) from its local districts. To send troops to troubled Kobdo required a large sum of money. As a matter of fact, all the soldiers were paid three to four months in advance. As a result, financial difficulty was another reason for the delay.

All the stations from Ku-ch'eng to Kobdo are managed by Mongols. But after the Kobdo incident, these Mongol managers were stirred up by the agents of Ulan Bator to refuse transmission of messages. As a result, both supplies and transmission of reports and messages were interrupted. Consequently no information about the movement of the enemy on the front was ever received. Without proper information about the enemy, it was impossible to make plans for our offensive. This is another reason for our failure. Because of the Kobdo incident, all the ruling princes of the Moslems in Turfan, Kucha and Aksu have been instructed to organize new units, these units to be commanded by their own leaders. The Moslems are known to be good fighters, and therefore are best suited to fight the Mongols. The city of Yuan-hu serves as a training center where a garrison has been established and a food station set up. At present, we should lose no time in organizing a new army and raising money for emergencies. For in a couple of months, heavy snow will fall along the mountainside, and the enemy cavalry can romp around at ease. Should the entire area become involved in war, the whole northwest would be in great danger.⁴⁵

After Kobdo was lost to the Mongols, Sinkiang, particularly the Altai region, was exposed to danger. Anxious to defend the Altai, Governor Yang consulted the Mongolian prince Bolida (Po-le-ta), a leader of the Mongols in the Altai region. They even discussed plans to recover Kobdo. In their plan, troops from Sinkiang were to be commanded by the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-29.

Mongol prince, but stationed at Cha-han-tung-ku. When the Russian consul at Kobdo and Uliasutai heard about the Chinese plans for retaking Kobdo, he sent the following note to warn the governor of Sinkiang:

On August 7, Kobdo was occupied by the Mongols. The High Commissioner of Kobdo, P'u Jun, had handed the official seal over to the Mongolian authorities. Through the mediation of my office, the commanding officer of the Mongol troops promised to protect both the High Commissioner and his staff with the understanding that the Chinese troops would not try to retake Kobdo. Since the prince of Altai, Bolida, agreed to settle this problem by peaceful means, an agreement has been reached between him and the Mongols of Outer Mongolia. They have agreed that Kobdo will be controlled by the government of Mongolia, but that the Altai will remain as a territory of China. In view of the good and friendly relationship between my country and yours, I therefore offer you my services and good wishes hoping that peace would prevail along the border and war between Ulan Bator and Peking could be avoided. If the above agreement has not reached you and before the instructions from Peking reach Commissioner P'u, I advise you to stop sending your troops to Kobdo so that peace can be preserved and war can be avoided.⁴⁶

By November 1912, the officials at Ku-ch'eng received another note from the Russian consul at Uliasutai warning them that Chinese troops were sent to the territory of Mongolia, the Russian troops stationed there would be instructed to ally with the Mongols. The full text of that note read:

To the Commanding Officer at Ku-ch'eng:

It is reported that your troops are but an untrained mob. It is merely because of your pride that you send troops to the front. I know very well that you don't have even five thousand soldiers at Ku-ch'eng, and that those who enlisted were poor people who could not make a living otherwise. The population in Uliasutai is large and dense. But because the Chinese authorities there wished to drive all the Mongols out of the territory, the Mongol people who lived in nearby areas such as Yaktai and Chirkai were so afraid that they sought protection from the Russian authorities. The cause of this unrest was rooted in the rumored reform which the Manchu government planned to carry out. If your troops come here, the Mongols will not let you do what you plan. I suggest a peaceful settlement of the trouble so that war is not necessary. If you insist on sending your troops to this area, I am afraid that we will meet force with force. For this reason I am now sending you this note. I have received instruction from our Emperor (Tsar) to attempt in every way possible to prevent your troops from entering this territory. Let us hope that peace will prevail and no one will get hurt. I speak thus to you because of the peaceful relations between our two countries. Every word of mine is true and sincere. I do not intend to deceive anyone.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

Governor Yang immediately reported these threatening notes from the Russians to the Central Government and requested Peking to lodge a strong protest with the Russian minister there over their deliberate interference with the internal affairs of China. But because of Russian intervention, his plan for recovering Kobdo was being temporarily given up.

He took this opportunity as a good excuse for stepping up border defense and consolidating his power in Sinkiang. Not only did he make careful military arrangements along the northeastern border adjacent to Outer Mongolia, such as the strategic centers like Ha-mi, Chen-si, Ch'i-t'ai, Sui-lai, Altai, Wu-su (or Kulklawusu), T'a-ch'eng, he also strengthened his military control of other strategic areas including Ili and Ching-ho in the west, Yen-ch'i and Wen-su in the southwest, Wu-shih and Pu-li in the south. Consequently, the whole of Sinkiang was placed under his direct control.⁴⁸

Finally in February, 1913, as Governor Yang had expected, a report came to him from the border that the Mongols had assembled about three thousand troops in the Kobdo area with signs of invading Sinkiang. The nearest place in Sinkiang to Kobdo is Wu-liang-hai of Altai ruled by Prince Bolida. Governor Yang, after hearing the report from the front, immediately sent word to the prince to prepare for the enemy attack. All important places along the border were closely watched, except the River Saksai between Kobdo and Altai. That river was usually frozen over during the winter season. In spring when the ice and snow had melted, the river could be used as a short-cut from Kobdo to Wu-liang-hai of Altai. To make defense preparations complete, Governor Yang planned to station his troops along the river from Cha-han-t'ung-ku to Bulun Tokhoi. But when the Russian consul at Ti-hua heard of this plan, he warned the governor that Russian troops would be sent down the river if Chinese soldiers were stationed there. The Russian intervention again forced Governor Yang to cancel his plan for defending the Saksai River.⁴⁹

The clash between the invading Mongols and the Chinese defenders finally came on April 11, 1913. The Chinese authorities received information saying that the Mongols were gathered in the area of T'ai-chi and Pao-ching-t'un, about seventy *li* from Cha-han-t'ung-ku. Twelve days later another report from the front said that the Mongols were looting along the Bulgen River and had put up 30 tents along the upper stream. But because of a shortage of supplies faced by the Mongols and because

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-62, Yang's report to the Central Government.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, V, V-B, pp. 13-23.

of epidemic diseases suffered by both sides, largescale fighting was not waged at the beginning.

But about a month later, on May 22, the commanding officer of the Chinese troops at Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku received a strange note from the commander of the Mongolian troops demanding to know whether Chinese troops were stationed at Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku. The following reply was sent to the Mongols by Chang Chien, the commanding officer at Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku:

By the proclamation of the Empress Dowager of the late Ch'ing dynasty, the territory of Outer Mongolia belongs to China. Even after the establishment of the Republic of China, the Constitution also recognizes Mongolia as a part of China. The principle of the Republic of Five Peoples (Chinese, Manchus, Mongols Moslems and Tibetans) must be observed by all. If the Mongolian leaders express loyalty to the Republic, their ranks will be honored by the President (of the Republic) and the Mongolian people will also enjoy great privileges. Unfortunately, the leaders of Ulan Bator first proclaimed their independence in 1911, and later sent troops to take Kobdo. Now we have heard the reports that they are about to invade the Altai. Since the Altai is our territory, how can we fear to see it invaded by outsiders? Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku is on our first line of defense, and by the orders of our president at Peking we have stationed troops there for any eventuality. If the leaders of Ulan Bator had not sent their soldiers to this area, we would not have sent ours either. But now that the authorities of Ulan Bator have marched their troops into our territory, we have no other choice but to take up arms to defend our land. Furthermore, the independence proclaimed by the leaders of Ulan Bator was not necessarily supported by all the people of Mongolia. Now our President has ordered us to cease all fighting so that peaceful negotiations can be conducted. Should the Mongols ignore our intentions for peaceful settlement by resuming fighting, then our soldiers, for the defense of the territory, would no longer be inclined to make any further concessions.⁵⁰

The Mongolian note was actually an ultimatum, for on June 17, the Mongols began to attack the Chinese positions. They came from three different fronts: their first group attacked the Bulgen River from Wu-liang-hai; their second and third groups rushed to Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku and Wu-hun-chi respectively from Pa-ching-t'un. Realizing that the only effective way of checking the Mongol invaders was by use of artillery, the Chinese moved their artillery units to Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku. This grave situation was, however, temporarily relieved by the swelling of the Bulgen River. Lacking suitable equipment, the Mongols could not cross the river. The Chinese troops, on this side of the river, watched closely the movements of the enemy troops.⁵¹

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-52.

On July 3, the Mongol Commander sent a second note to General Chang Chien, demanding Chinese withdrawal from Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku within the next ten days. But on the same night, a group of between four and five thousand Mongols made a sudden attack on the Chinese line. General Chang ordered his men to hold their positions until dawn, when artillery fire would be able to repulse the enemy attack. This clash resulted in casualties of 200 men and 300 horses on the Mongol side, and on the Chinese side a casualty of 62 men dead and 98 wounded. Preparing for a second assault, Governor Yang strengthened the Chinese positions by combining the forces at the Bulgen River and Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku.⁵²

The second assault by the Mongols came on July 11. This time they attacked Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku on two fronts: their first group consisting of three thousand cavalry troops, attacked the main garrison, while their second group went around the mountains in the south and tried to break through the main defense of the Chinese. The first group was easily beaten by General Chang's men, but their second group put the Chinese defenders in great danger. In desperation, General Chang sent his deputy commander together with another regiment headed by Ma Te-kui to reinforce the main defense line. The Mongols were finally pushed back, leaving more than a hundred dead behind them. The Chinese suffered only minor casualties of five killed and seven wounded. However, among the dead was the commander of the regiment, Ma Te-kui.⁵³

Just before the second assault by the Mongols, the Central Government of China and the Russian minister to Peking reached an agreement on the Kobdo incident. They agreed that in the region from Wulianghai and Kazakh to the north of the Altai mountains, no troops would be stationed by either government. The Russians promised to restrict the authorities of Ulan Bator from sending their troops westward. Thus, the Mongol attack on Ch'an-han-t'ung-ku was in reality a breach of agreement on the part of the Russian government. In this connection, Governor Yang Tseng-hsin sent a telegram to Peking advising the Government to lodge a strong protest with Russia. At the same time, he submitted a memorandum to the Government analyzing the Sinkiang situation and arguing against war with the Mongols.

The following is a summary of his memorandum:

1. First of all, from the point of view of the entire nation, a continued war with the Mongols is disadvantageous for four reasons:

(a) The five peoples in the new Republic are like brothers in a big

⁵² *Ibid.*, V, V-C, pp. 4-5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

family; they should work together in peace and harmony to promote welfare for one another. Once war is started, hatred among them will be deepened. Historical events such as the wars between Athens and Sparta, conflicts between the Catholics and Protestants, should be good lessons for us.

(b) The Mongols during Yuan times were the most powerful people of the world. Given another chance, they could again prove their prowess. With the impact of modern civilization, the Mongols could become a formidable and organized people who would always menace China's northwest.

(c) Although a Republican régime has been established in China, the foundation of the nation is far from being firmly laid, and unification is far from being complete. Under these circumstances, it would be foolish to wage wars against other people. Besides, to build a great army would cost a lot of money. It is almost impossible to accomplish this goal when the financial situation in the northwest is so poor and the economic resources are so limited. At this moment, it is more advisable to concentrate on solving our internal problems than to engage war against others.

(d) The independence of Outer Mongolia was supported by a powerful Russia. It is impossible for us to fight the Russians. Even if we could defeat the Mongols, the Russians would eventually intervene. Should war break out between Russia and China, the provinces along the border such as Kirin, Heilungchiang and Sinkiang would easily become the victims. The Russians have long been known for their territorial ambitions and greed. If we should involve ourselves in wars with the Mongols and the Russians, the foundation of the newly formed Republic would be greatly shattered.

2. Second, from the point of view of Sinkiang, war with Mongolia would be disastrous to China on the following considerations:

(a) Sinkiang province borders Mongolia from East to West. Should war break out, it would be impossible for us to defend such a long border.

(b) In the province there are settled many Mongols including the tribes of Torgut (tu-erh-hu-t'e), located in Wu-su, T'a-ch'eng and Yeh-chi; the Koshut (Ho-shuo-t'e) of Yen-chi, the Chahar, the Solon and the Olot (o-lu-t'e) of Ili, who have intermingled with the Chinese, Moslems and the Uighurs in Sinkiang. The reason why they have not joined with Ulan Bator is partly because their ruling princes are still loyal to the Chinese government, and partly because they are afraid of the Chinese troops. If we should fight the Mongols of Ulan Bator, and if we should

happen to lose the war, the ruling princes of these tribes in Sinkiang could easily switch their loyalty to Ulan Bator.

(c) The Russian soldiers stationed at Kashgar have been recently increased on the pretext of protecting their merchants. At Ili and Ning-yuan, the Russian troops have also been increased. The Russians have also reinforced their troops along the border and sent their agents to Sinkiang to purchase supplies. The ambition of the Russians in territorial expansion has long been known to all. It should be well remembered that in March of this year the Russian consul did intervene with our defense of the Saikai River. These activities of the Russians give substantial support to our belief that they are helping the régime of Ulan Bator even at the expense of international law and agreements. If war with Ulan Bator is declared, the Russian soldiers would definitely intervene by disturbing our border regions. Our war effort would be weakened.

(d) Ili is still independent from Sinkiang. Altai and T'a-ch'eng are still autonomous regions ruled by their own chiefs. In addition, Kashgar has also indicated its desire to become an independent area. Thus within the same province, there are several independent states. Meanwhile, the bandits of the secret Ko-lao-hui are still rampant. If war should break out with Outer Mongolia, and if Sinkiang should lose the war, all these regions would then seize the opportunity to proclaim independence from Sinkiang. Consequently, our dream and desire of unifying Sinkiang and making it an integral part of the Republic would be ultimately destroyed.

(e) Sinkiang has just become a province under the Republic. During the Ch'ing dynasty, the subsidy given to Sinkiang by the Manchu government amounted to 2,400,000 taels of silver each year. But during the first half of 1913, Sinkiang received a subsidy of only 100,000 taels of silver from the Central Government. The only other income of the provincial government was the revenue from the Kashgar district amounting to 50,000 taels of silver. The finances of Sinkiang have, so far, relied on the issuance of paper currency without any reserve fund in the provincial treasury. Once the trust of the people in the paper currency is gone, the finances of this province will be in total chaos. For this reason, a war with the Mongols might hasten such a financial chaos in Sinkiang.

3. Third, from the point of view of Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku, there are also several considerations against war with the Mongols:

(a) From Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku to Ku-ch'eng, there is a distance of forty *li* along which no inhabitants are to be found. The rest of this area is nothing but desert. The only means of transportation available is camels. But in time of emergency even camels are difficult to get. If war

should break out with the Mongols, the problem of providing supplies to Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku would be a very serious one.

(b) Similarly the problem of reinforcement to Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku is equally serious. If the enemy forces should cut through from the rear, then the whole situation would be hopeless.

(c) After the war with Ili, ammunition supplies in Sinkiang have been rather much exhausted. As a result, troops sent to the Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku front can only be allotted three hundred bullets per person. In a war with the Mongols, even supplies can be arranged; without ammunition the defeat of the Chinese would be deadly certain.

(d) The troops have been stationed in Ch'a-han-t'ung-ku for more than a year. There are no proper barracks for them. They have to use tents which are not suitable in severe weather. On the other side of Ch'an-han-t'ung-ku there are the pasture lands of the Mongols. Without geographical knowledge of the Mongol's positions, the Chinese troops, regardless of how strong they are, will never be able to take the initiative. Should they be defeated the Chinese must retreat to Ku-ch'eng. On that route there is neither water nor grass. Even if the enemy does not pursue them, many of the Chinese soldiers will die from hunger and thirst. For this consideration, war with the Mongols is disadvantageous to us.⁵⁴

In a word, Governor Yang was very much against a war with Mongolia. He favored negotiation with the Russian government for a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. Finally in October, 1913, a local agreement was reached between the ruling prince of the Altai and the Russian consul, and the following articles were stipulated:

Article 1. The troops of Sinkiang and Mongolia will remain in their own positions but make no effort in either advancing or attacking the other side. Both parties shall wait for the signing of an official treaty between China and Russia.

Article 2. Until the signing of such a treaty, the border between the Altai in Sinkiang and Kobdo in Mongolia will be defined as along the Altai Mountains and the Bulgen River.

Article 3. The people residing in Wulianghai and Kasakh, regardless of whether a treaty is signed between the two countries, shall be allowed to move freely for a period of eight months beginning from the signing of this agreement. Neither the Chinese authorities nor the Mongolian authorities are to interfere with their movements. After this period is over, those who have settled in the north of the Altai Mountain will be under the jurisdiction of Kobdo.

Article 4. From the date of the signing of this agreement both Altai and Kobdo are to be opened for trade; the merchants there shall be free to do business, and their lives and property shall be protected by the local authorities.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

Article 5. Before the signing of the official treaty between China and Russia, the Chinese troops in Altai are not to be increased; nor are the Mongols to be allowed to increase their troops on their side. The number of soldiers under training shall be decided upon by the Chinese government.

Article 6. Both sides shall observe the stipulations in this agreement until the signing of the formal treaty between these two countries.⁵⁵

The official treaty between China and Russia was signed on November 5, 1913. In this treaty China recognized and respected the autonomy of Outer Mongolia and in return, Russia recognized China's sovereignty over Mongolia.⁵⁶ In March of 1914, both Sinkiang and Mongolia withdrew their troops from the Kobdo-Altai front. The danger of war between Sinkiang and Mongolia was avoided.

V. DISTURBANCES BY THE RUSSIAN KAZAKHS IN SINKIANG

In 1916, on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Tsar of Russia, in order to cope with the rising tide of revolution, sent orders to every part of Russia urging people to join the army. When the order came to the territory of the Kazakhs, the people of a village by the name of Lake Hala refused to obey the government order. The officer of the Tsar's army in charge of the enforcement of this order arrested the leader of that village and executed him on the spot. This outrageous action infuriated the entire tribe. They rose in revolt, seized and killed all the army officers in their area. To suppress the rebellious Kazakhs, the Russian government sent troops to the area. Unable to resist the troops of the government, the Kazakhs fled in large groups to neighboring Sinkiang.⁵⁷

The local authorities of Sinkiang, including the High Commissioner of Ili, had already learned about the plight of the Kazakhs from the Russian consul at Ili who had previously warned the Office of the High Commissioner that the fleeing Kazakhs might choose to enter Sinkiang. But before any plans or preparations were made by the local officials of Sinkiang, the Kazakhs had already swamped Sinkiang. By October, 1916, almost all border areas in Sinkiang, such as T'a-ch'eng in the north, Ili in the west, Kashgar and Aksu in the south, were the scenes and centers of the Kazakh refugees.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, V, V-D, pp. 3-4; also see MacMurray, John, V. A. *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 1066-1067.

⁵⁶ For the text of this treaty, see MacMurray, *ibid.*, pp. 1066-1067.

⁵⁷ Yang, *op. cit.*, V, VI-A, pp. 1-3.

In confronting such an unexpected and yet burdensome problem, Governor Yang Tseng-hsin had to exercise great caution in mapping out a plan to cope with the refugees from Russia. Knowing that to cope with these people by force would aggravate the situation, he hoped to drive these Kazakhs out of Sinkiang by peaceful means. He revealed his wishes in a letter sent to the High Commissioner of T'a-ch'eng. He said in part:

The Russian Kazakhs entered our territory because they were frightened by the armed suppression of the Tsar's government. If we deal with them by force, they will resist us by force. As a result, peace and order in our cities will be destroyed. Furthermore, in suppressing the Kazakh revolt, Russian troops killed four thousand of our people in the Lake Hala area. If we should kill any Kazakh by accident, it would give the Russian government an excuse to shun responsibilities for what they done in Lake Hala. Besides, the Kazakh refugees are huge in number, and our troops are rather small in size. We cannot be sure of succeeding by force. It is my hope that you and your men should try your best to drive those Kazakhs out peacefully. At the same time, those who have not yet entered our territory should be stopped at the border . . . In other words, we shall try all possibilities to seek a peaceful solution to the Kazakh problem . . .⁵⁸

Governor Yang Tseng-hsin realized that if the Tsar's government continued its armed suppression of the Kazakh revolt, he would never be able to send the Kazakhs back to Russia. He urged the Central Government at Peking to enter into negotiations with the Russian envoy to allow the Kazakhs to return home in peace. Governor Yang was anxious to have the Kazakh problem solved for several reasons: first of all, law and order in Sinkiang had just been restored with the final suppression of the secret societies. The infiltration of Kazakh refugees numbered nearly 300,000 by the end of October, 1916, and could, once again, plunge the entire province into a state of confusion. Second, his small army and limited supplies could not tackle such a gigantic problem. Besides, the problem of food shortage in Sinkiang had been a serious one confronting him ever since he took office in 1911, as he simply had no way to feed such a tremendous number of refugees from outside. Furthermore, the rumors of the invasion of Sinkiang by outside intruders constituted another big worry in his mind. For these reasons, Yang Tseng-hsin was desperate to do almost anything in order to have the Kazakh problem solved in a short period of time.

Finally on October 31, 1916, the governor of Russian Turkestan suggested several conditions under which the Kazakh problem could be solved:

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

- 1) The Kazakhs should immediately surrender the Andizhan tribe to the Russian Government.
- 2) They should surrender all their arms.
- 3) They should surrender the leaders of the revolt to the government.
- 4) They should promise that they would always render service to the Tsar's government.
- 5) They should immediately evacuate the pasture lands they had occupied with the permission of the government.
- 6) All the leaders with their tribes should return to their own pastures.
- 7) If the Kazakhs accepted all these terms, the Tsar's government would promise not to harass them.⁵⁹

Having learned of these terms, Governor Yang immediately passed them on to the Kazakhs occupying the valley of River Tekes. But before the Kazakhs had a chance to study these terms, the Russian authorities changed their mind. They demanded permission to send troops to Sinkiang to arrest the leaders of the rebellious Kazakhs. Despite Governor Yang's protest, the Russians sent their officers over to Sinkiang and arrested several Kazakh leaders in the Kashgar area. Fearing that trouble might ensue, Governor Yang sent three cavalry regiments to the Kashgar area to preserve order and to prepare for any emergency. But when the Chinese troops appeared at the scene with the cooperation of the local Russian consul, all the Kazakhs in this area expressed their willingness to go back to their own country.

Consequently, the Kazakh refugees in the Kashgar district were easily repatriated to Russia. This gave the local authorities hope to handle the refugee problem in other areas. But when they began to take steps to remove the Kazakhs from the Ili district, they met several difficulties: First of all, the Russian authorities, especially the Army officers, repeatedly demanded the arrest of the leaders first before they took back the rest of the Kazakhs. Second, since the Tekes River Valley in the Ili area was very close to Lake Hala where the first Kazakh revolt started, the number of refugees gathered there was considerably larger in this area than other places. Third, because Russian troops had been sent to guard all the strategic points along the border, it was difficult for the Kazakh refugees to go back to Russia. Fourth, the Russian consul at Ili was not as cooperative as the consul at Kashgar. As a result, the problem of repatriating the Kazakh refugees at Ili became complicated.

The persistence and pressure of the local Chinese officials in solving the refugee problem finally forced the Russian representative at Ili to

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

give in. It was agreed by the two parties that a period of three months be allowed to complete the repatriation. At the end of May, 1917, the task of repatriating about 160,000 Kazakh refugees in Ili was successfully carried out.⁶⁰

With the main bulk of the Kazakh refugees returned to Russia, other small groups in other districts, such as Kucha, Pai-ch'eng and Wen-su, were all easily handled by the Sinkiang officials. By September 22, 1917, all the Kazakhs except for a small group who could not return for various reasons, had been sent back to Russia. Later, reports received by Governor Yang mentioned that a number of these refugees had either been killed or were dead of mistreatment by the Russian officials. Shocked by the cruelty and mistreatment of the Kazakhs by the Tsar's government, Governor Yang urged the Peking Government to protest to the Russian minister, for he feared that the misconduct of the Russian officials might scare the remaining Kasakhs in Sinkiang from going back.⁶¹

Fortunately, by fall of 1918, all Kazakh refugees were sent back to Russia. According to Governor Yang's estimate, there were at least 300,000 Kazakhs being repatriated from Sinkiang. Although some minor troubles were caused by these refugees to Sinkiang, because of the swift and tactful handling of Governor Yang and other officials, no serious damage was caused in Sinkiang province.

VI. THE RETREAT OF THE WHITE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS TO SINKIANG, 1918-21

Perhaps the greatest trouble Governor Yang Tseng-hsin ever had to face during his administration in Sinkiang was caused by the retreat of the White Russian soldiers into Sinkiang province after they were defeated by the Bolshevik Army during the October Revolution of 1917. Like the Kazakh rebels who sought refuge in Sinkiang, the Tsar's Army followed suit and entered that province in great numbers. Nearly all the important cities, such as T'a-ch'eng, Ili, Kashgar, Ku-ch'eng and Altai (later called A-shan), were the target areas for the retreating soldiers. This story is perhaps one of the most interesting and yet forgotten chapters of the Russian Revolution. To Governor Yang Tseng-hsin, this was perhaps one of the most significant problems with an international flavor that his administration ever encountered. From the files and documents of his

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

"Studio of Remission" (Pu-kuo-chai), we are able to sort out a complete record of the event. The relating of this story will not only present a climax of his political career, but also reveal the gifted shrewdness of his character and personality.

*A. The prelude to the retreat—the request for passage
made by the White Army to Sinkiang*

On November 7, 1918, the High Commissioner of T'a-ch'eng (in northern Sinkiang) received a note from the Russian consul at T'a-ch'eng requesting on behalf of the Russian commander, General Anyenkov (A-nien-k'o-fu), permission for Russian troops to pass through T'a-ch'eng and Ili to Russia. Unable to make a decision, the High Commissioner of T'a-ch'eng asked Governor Yang for instructions. Naturally Governor Yang rejected the request of the Russian army. In the meantime, Yang sent the Central Government a memorandum in which he advised the central authorities to remind the Russian minister at Peking to stop their troops from crossing Sinkiang. He said in the memorandum:

If we permit Russian troops to pass through T'a-ch'eng and Ili, not only would these cities become battlefields of the Russian revolution, the Bolshevik troops might even extend their fighting to other places in Sinkiang, such as from their Tashkent to Kashgar, and from their Lake Hala to our Wu-shih. Consequently, these districts would be involved in the Russian Revolutionary War. Besides, the Russian troops requesting passage through Sinkiang number more than five thousand men, and food supplies at Ili are very limited. Without proper supplies for these soldiers, troubles and disturbances are bound to happen, and the peace and order just restored to these areas will again be destroyed . . . Should fighting break out in the Ili area, the bandits of the secret societies on both sides of the T'ien-shan mountains (meaning the entire province) would rise again. In this case, not only would law and order in these districts be difficult to preserve, trade and commerce which both the Russian merchants and the local people have enjoyed so much would also be pitifully ruined.⁶²

The Russian hope of passing through Sinkiang was temporarily broken. By May, 1919, things became very difficult for the White troops on the other side of the Sinkiang border and their efforts at putting down the revolution seemed to approach naught. At this time, reports from T'a-ch'eng on several cases of looting and robbery were received by Governor Yang, all committed by the soldiers of a defeated army — the White Army. Later, things became even worse for the Tsar's troops, who sent their representatives to T'a-ch'eng for help in order that they could join forces

⁶² *Ibid.*, V, XII-A, pp. 4-5.

with Sinkiang to suppress the revolution. Six months later, the Whites were completely defeated. They had no other choice but to retreat to the closest and safest area, Sinkiang.

B. The retreat of the White Army to T'a-ch'eng

On January 14, 1920, the commanding officer of the White Army, General Anyenkov, made a sudden appearance at Ta-ch'eng. The High Commissioner there immediately reported to Governor Yang, whose instruction to the Commissioner was to watch closely the movements of the Russian troops and to guard all strategic points along the international border. Long before this happened, Governor Yang had already announced his policy of neutrality with respect to the Russian internal strife. Should any Russian troops, regardless of which side, cross the border over to Sinkiang, they would be immediately disarmed by the Chinese authorities according to the rules and practices of international law.⁶³

After the White troops retreated into Sinkiang, Governor Yang Tseng-hsin gave the High Commissioner of T'a-ch'eng and other officials three instructions for coping with the situation: (1) as soon as the Russians came across the border, they were to be immediately disarmed; (2) the leaders of the Bolshevik Party should be immediately informed of the disarming of the Tsar's troops so that they would not make a hot pursuit of their enemy over into the territory of a neutral power; (3) all negotiations with either the Red Army or the White Army must be conducted in peaceful atmosphere so that law and order along the border could be preserved.⁶⁴

Two months later, beginning March 27, 1920, the defeated White soldiers began to pour into Sinkiang. It was estimated that over 7,000 troops and refugees crossed the border and fled into the territory of Sinkiang in the T'a-ch'eng area. The local officials at T'a-ch'eng immediately disarmed all troops and placed them in prepared quarters. When the Red Army reached the border and saw that the Chinese officials had already disarmed the Whites, they were satisfied, and did not come over the Chinese border.

But to guard and take care of such a huge number of Russian troops became quite a problem for Governor Yang and other officials of Sinkiang government. The first step Governor Yang took was to instruct the High Commissioner of T'a-ch'eng to recruit two regiments of cavalry from

⁶³ *Ibid.*, V, XII-B, pp. 2-3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

among the local Mongol population. Then he gave detailed instructions to provide housing and food supplies for the White soldiers and refugees. He also sent a representative to Russia to reassure the Red Army of Sinkiang's neutrality towards the Russian revolution and in return to demand the Bolshevik government to honor such a neutrality.

Subsequently, the Bolshevik regime sent its representatives to the border and negotiated with the authorities of Sinkiang on the problem of repatriating the White Army and refugees. Governor Yang's attitudes towards the whole situation, as indicated in his instructions to his local officials, can be summarized as follows: As far as the refugees were concerned, he suggested that the refugees negotiate directly with the Bolshevik Government for a mutually satisfactory arrangement. All the Chinese authorities could do would be to persuade the refugees to go home. Should there be sick among them, they would be allowed to remain in Sinkiang until they were completely recovered. On the problem of the repatriation of the soldiers, Governor Yang opposed any forced repatriation because, in his opinion, a show of force would probably result in further and more serious trouble. On the question of repatriating the Russian consul at T'a-ch'eng, Governor Yang suggested that he wait until all the Russian refugees were sent back. The representatives of Sinkiang and the Bolshevik government had a rather peaceful and amicable meeting at the border. The Bolshevik representative agreed to respect Sinkiang's neutrality and repatriation on a voluntary and peaceful basis.⁶⁵

By the end of May, 1920, some 150 officers and four thousand men of the White Army were repatriated. The remaining group at T'a-ch'eng numbered five thousand men. Most of the refugees had also gone back by this time, only some six hundred civilians remaining in T'a-ch'eng.⁶⁶

During the repatriation, the local Chinese authorities uncovered a plot engineered by some of the loyal diehards of the White Army to kill their commanding general by the name of Bashchich. It was learned that the White troops, while retreating to Sinkiang, had buried some weapons and equipment along the way, and hoped to fight their way back to Russia. Fortunately this plot was discovered by the Chinese authorities before it caused any damage. Because of this plot, however, the local authorities hastened their steps on the repatriation task.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, V, XII-C, p. 18.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

C. The retreat of the White troops to Ili

Early in March, 1920, the commanding general at Ili, Yang Fei-hsia, reported to Governor Yang Tseng-hsin that the White Army under the command of General Anyenkov had been defeated by the Red Army, and according to his observation the White troops might be forced to retreat to Sinkiang across the border at Ili. By April 7, another report came to the governor saying that about one thousand soldiers of the White Army had been gathered along the Russian-Sinkiang border. Governor Yang's instructions to the Ili authorities were: first, that the Russians were to be prevented by all means from entering Sinkiang, and that if they should force their way into Sinkiang, they were to be disarmed by the Chinese authorities. At the same time, Chinese troops were rushed to the border to guard all entrance points. Governor Yang also permitted the authorities of Ili to recruit a militia team from the Mongolian population in order to cope with any emergency.⁶⁸

On April 13, a group of Russian White Armymen under the command of a General Dotoff came over to Sinkiang and agreed to surrender their arms to the Chinese officials. The magistrate of Ching-ho where the Russian soldiers took their refuge was instructed to make all provisions including lodging and food for the retreated Russians. The magistrate had to organize a special food-supply committee to take care of the Russian soldiers.⁶⁹

What Governor Yang worried most over was the much larger group under the command of General Anyenkov. His instruction to the Ili officials was to stop and disarm Anyenkov at Hung-yen-ch'ih, a small town near Ching-ho. Food supplies for this huge army were to be provided by the joint efforts of the two districts, Ching-ho and Wu-su.

When everything was prepared and ready, Anyenkov's men began to pour into Sinkiang in several groups. The first group of about 180 men came on May 3, 1920; the second, numbering seven hundred men with 253 rifles and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition came over on May 5; the third group of 587 men with 127 guns and four thousand rounds of ammunition arrived in Sinkiang on May 6; the fourth group of 146 men with only 4 guns, 6 swords and 380 rounds of ammunition got over on May 8. All these men were immediately disarmed by the local authorities.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, V, XII-F, p. 9.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-25.

Finally by the end of May, General Anyenkov himself came over to Sinkiang. At first he refused to be disarmed. After he was assured of his safety, Anyenkov was finally willing to surrender his arms on May 29. A final count of 1,260 men together with 63 machine guns, 357 rifles, 348 cases of ammunition, 355 swords and one case of bombs, was recorded by the local authorities.⁷¹

A few days later after his surrender, General Anyenkov asked the local authorities for permission to go to India by way of Kashgar. Governor Yang rejected his request but advised him to go back to Russia since the Bolshevik Government had proclaimed an amnesty for all White soldiers. Angered by Governor Yang's refusal, Anyenkov secretly plotted to escape. He sent some of his men to the border to dig up the arms they had buried on the way. He planned to join forces with those soldiers detained at T'a-ch'eng and to fight their way back to Russia. His plot was finally uncovered by the authorities. All those involved in the plot were sent back to Russia except for General Anyenkov who was transferred to Ku-ch'eng for custody.⁷²

D. The White army's request to enter Kashgar

As early as March of 1919, the Russian consul at Kashgar asked the local authorities at Kashgar for assistance in the war against the Red Army. The request was naturally turned down by Governor Yang Tseng-hsin. In October, a general of the White army by the name of Muknov came over to Kashgar requesting the local authorities for permission for his troops to enter Kashgar. Commissioner Chu Jui-ch'i of Kashgar reported this to Governor Yang and asked for instructions. The governor instructed him in the following details: (1) only soldiers would be allowed to enter Sinkiang; (2) they should be first disarmed at the border before they were permitted to cross over the border; (3) as soon as they reached Kashgar, the soldiers should be immediately sent to T'a-ch'eng from where they would be eventually repatriated back to Russia; (4) they were not allowed to bring any arms to T'a-ch'eng; and (5) no other soldiers should be permitted to cross the border and enter Kashgar later on.⁷³

For a year nothing happened. In March, 1920, a representative from the White army was again sent to Kashgar both for financial help and for permission to recruit soldiers for the White Army. This request was

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 36-40.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, V, XII-G, pp. 1-4.

again rejected by Governor Yang. Then General Muknov asked the governor for permission for his troops to retreat into India by way of Sinkiang. Again this request was turned down. Finally, all his hopes given up, General Muknov surrendered to the Red Army.⁷⁴

E. Anyenkov's revolt at Ku-ch'eng

When General Anyenkov and his men failed in their plot to join forces with the White troops at T'a-ch'eng, he was transferred to Ku-ch'eng for custody. In the meantime, Governor Yang had plans made to repatriate all of them to Russia by way of Kobdo. On January 6, 1921, a report reached the capital of Sinkiang, Ti-hua, saying that a riot had been staged by the Russian soldiers at Ku-ch'eng and fighting had been exchanged between the Chinese guards and the detained Russian soldiers. It was further reported that the White soldiers at Ku-ch'eng had possession of a large quantity of arms including 25 machine guns, one field cannon, 300 rifles, 2,000 bombs and 300 spears, which they had apparently dug up along the border.⁷⁵

Naturally such an unexpected move on the part of the defeated White Army caused a great deal of worry and anxiety to Governor Yang Tseng-hsin. To cope with this emergency, the governor not only instructed the local troops to keep the Russians under control, he also mobilized other troops available in the province to reinforce the Ku-ch'eng force. From Ha-mi in the east, he rushed 600 men to Ku-ch'eng. From the provincial capital he dispatched 200 artillery soldiers, 300 infantry troops and 200 cavalry to the troubled scene. From the western regions, he also alerted another 700 men to be rushed to Ku-ch'eng. His hope was not only to quell down the revolt, but to disarm the White troops completely so that no further disturbance would recur.

When the military preparations were all set, Governor Yang sent the Commissioner for Education, Liu Wen-kung, as his personal representative to talk with General Anyenkov for a peaceful solution. On January 27, an ultimatum was delivered to Anyenkov demanding his surrender within twentyfour hours. If the Russians failed to do so, the local authorities would be compelled to put down the revolt by force. Realizing his inferior position under such circumstances, Anyenkov could not but give up. So on January 28, the Russians surrendered again the trouble at Ku-ch'eng was solved. Subsequently, all the White troops were sent back

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-37.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

to Russia by way of Kansu province with the sole exception of General Anyenkov, who was detained in Sinkiang until his death there.⁷⁶

F. *General Bashchich's occupation of Altai*

Of all the cities in Sinkiang province, T'a-ch'eng was probably the main center for the retreated Russian soldiers. The group retreated to T'a-ch'eng was commanded by General Bashchich. In 1921, another group of 3,000 men under the command of General Novikov retreated to the north of T'a-ch'eng, armed with 1,900 rifles, 6 machine guns and more than 300 military vehicles.

Prior to this, Governor Yang had reached a preliminary understanding with the newly formed Soviet Government of Russia on the question of whether the Red Army should be allowed to enter Sinkiang if the White Army refused to surrender their arms to the local Chinese authorities. When the last group of White soldiers crossed the border and retreated to the T'a-ch'eng area, a group of the Red Army numbering 2,000 men followed them in hot pursuit. As a result, fighting between these two groups broke out in Chinese territory on May 25, 1921. By June 14, General Bashchich's troops were again defeated by the Reds. Since all the strategic towns around T'a-ch'eng were well guarded by the Chinese troops, the only possible way for the White Russians to flee was to Altai where the Chinese defense was rather thin and weak. So, during the night of June 14, the White Army managed to cross the Irtysh River and headed for Altai. Fortunately, the Bolshevik Army did not chase them any further, but turned back to Russia. The White troops forced their way to Altai. The Chinese High Commissioner, because of his failure in defending his town, committed suicide.⁷⁷

Unable to keep the huge number of White troops under control, Governor Yang Tseng-hsin negotiated with the Bolsheviks for a joint plan to cope with General Bashchich's group in Altai. By September, 1921, such an agreement was reached. The Red Army would advance to Sinkiang from the Zaisan area to make a frontal attack at the White troops, while the Chinese forces would wage an offensive from the rear. In the meantime, all the strategic points around Altai, such as the Bulgin River, Bulun Tokhoi, Ku-ch'eng and the Ching-ke-li River, were all to be securely guarded by the Chinese defenders. Unable to resist such a power-

⁷⁶ A detailed account of the later days of General Anyenkov in Sinkiang is given in Yang's record found in Series II, Chapters V and VI.

⁷⁷ Yang, *op. cit.*, Series V, Chapter VI, pp. 20-21, and 26-36.

ful joint attack of the Red Army and the Chinese Army, General Bashchich and his men, on September 18, fled Altai and fought their way to Kobdo in Outer Mongolia. On September 27, Chinese troops recaptured Altai where law and peace were once again established.⁷⁸

When the military campaigns were over in Russia and the new Bolshevik government established, most of the White soldiers in Sinkiang together with a large number of refugees were repatriated back to Russia. A small number of Russians, however, chose to remain in Sinkiang. These people became an integral portion of the population of Sinkiang, and thus add to the unique feature of ethnic complexity of modern Sinkiang province.

The disturbance caused by the retreated White soldiers during the Russian Revolution was one of the climaxes in the eventful years of Governor Yang Tseng-hsins administration in Sinkiang. During his seventeen years as governor, he made a great effort to weave Sinkiang into the fibre of modern China. Though his critics may have called him an autocrat for his harshness and dictatorship, after reviewing his political achievements during those eventful years we cannot but agree with one author in his evaluation of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin when he says that, "In all fairness it must be repeated that Yang Tseng-hsin was both an honest and a competent official by old Mandarin standards." and that "he had ruled Sinkiang for seventeen years, dealing successfully with the events that followed the Chinese Revolution, the Outer Mongolian Revolution and the Russian Revolution."⁷⁹

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Series V, Chapter VIII, pp. 5-20.

⁷⁹ See Lattimore, Owen, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), pp. 52-64.

REVIEWS

"Voprosy čuvaškogo yazyka i literatury" (Questions of Chuvash Language and Literature), Issue 18, *Učënye Zapiski* (Learned Memoirs, Naučno-issledovatel'skii Institut yazyka, literatury, istorii i ékonomiki pri Sovete Ministrov Čuvaškoi ASSR, Cheboksary, 1958, 244 pp.

Since 1941 the Scientific Research Institute for Language, Literature, History and Economics (title varies slightly), attached to the Soviet of Ministers of the Chuvash ASSR, has been issuing its own Learned Memoirs, previous issues of which have included important works by Chuvash scholars on their language (as Issues 7 and 8, Yegorov's "On the Origin of the Chuvash and their Language," and "The Lexical Composition of the Modern Chuvash Literary Language"). About 1,000 copies are usually printed, but these volumes do not seem to be widely circulated or utilized in the West. The present Issue 18 is devoted to questions of Chuvash language and literature, and contains over a dozen articles, all in Russian except one in Chuvash. The following remarks will briefly outline its contents. Titles of articles will be given only in translation.

The first article, by I. A. Andreyev (pp. 3-32) is "Two Types of Impersonal Sentences in Chuvash", and deals with subjectless clauses in *-as/-es* and *-malla/-melle*. The author's analysis is based on Russian syntax and grammar, but if one considers these forms as a *nomen futuri* and *nomen necessitatis* respectively, the search for a subject becomes unnecessary, and the forms become nominal in function. Next, A. E. Gorskii discusses "Phonetic Make-up of Russian Loans in Chuvash" (pp. 33-56). After first tracing the early influence of Russian language and culture on peoples of the Soviet Union, he treats early borrowings prior to 1930, giving many examples. Many typical sound changes are illustrated, as *doktor* > *tuxtär*, *Afanásii* > *Axvanís*, *Trofim* > *Trapxín*, with full discussion of assimilation, loss of consonants, epenthesis (*Stefan* > *ástappan*), the requirements of vowel harmony, and changes of accent. Up to the 1930's, Russian loanwords mostly accomodated themselves to the phonemes of Chuvash; after that date, words of Russian origin come into Chuvash with retention of their phonemes.

On pp. 57-85, U. Sh. Baičura's article "Some Kymographic Data on the Length of Vowels and the Voicedness and Length of Consonants in Chuvash" is a careful phonetic study treating words constructed of different sequences of vowels and consonants. The length of vowels and consonants is given in microseconds, and averages computed. Some of the conclusions are that vowels are longer in open syllables than in closed, that *ā* and *e* are shorter in duration than other vowels, that length is relative rather than absolute in Chuvash, and that the presence or absence of aspiration or a tense or lax articulation of consonants is no less important than their voicedness or

voicelessness. In addition to the tables, some kymographic tracings are appended.

S. P. Gorskii (pp. 85-119) discusses "Some Peculiarities in the Language and Style of Mikhail Sespel", covering lexical usage, morphological peculiarities and syntactic usage in the poetical writings of Sespel (1899-1922). B. A. Broitman writes on "Friendship of Peoples of the Soviet Union in the Poetry of Mayakovsky" (pp. 106-119). The only reason for including this article seems to be that Mayakovsky once briefly met the Chuvash poets Khuzangay and Shelebi. A valuable contribution is N. V. Nikol'skii's "On the Proverbs of the Chuvash People" (pp. 120-143), a topic heretofore rather neglected. Many examples, both pre-Revolutionary and of *kolkhoz* life, are given, with Chuvash text and translations.

A joint article by A. I. Petrukhin and I. I. Odyukov is titled "Achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the Subject Material of Chuvash Soviet oral-poetical Creativity" (pp. 144-168). It is mostly propaganda, as a defamatory poem about Truman on p. 167 shows. Pages 169-177, by A. I. Kuz'min, give a survey of "Chuvash Tales and Novels of 1956" and is followed by the work of V. Ya. Kanyukov (pp. 180-191), "Notes on the Plots of recent Chuvash Literary Works". Both articles give data on the current output of Chuvash literary figures.

A second portion of the book is devoted to *Discussions and Judgments* (pp. 192-233), first, I. A. Andreyev treating "Once More the Compound Subordinate Clause in Chuvash" (pp. 192-222), breaking lances with Ashmarin, Rezyukov and Pavlov, then, S. P. Gorskii's article, the only one in Chuvash, *Morfologi tytävēsem šine tērlēren pāḡni mēnren kilet?* ("How do the different treatments of morphological questions come about?"), pp. 223-228. The author asks where the various approaches to morphological phenomena come from in science, and expresses his views on some features of Chuvash, as the dative and accusative, the past participle and some other forms. Also in this portion is V. T. Seifullin's article "On the Existence of Diphthongs in Chuvash," pp. 229-233, which revolves about the question of whether in the syllabic nuclei *ay, uy, oy, ey, iy* and *äy*, the *-y* functions as a vowel or consonant. He concludes that it is consonantic, a view also expressed by this reviewer in a phonemic analysis of Chuvash to appear in 1961 from the Indiana University Press. The last portion of the book is "Criticisms and Bibliography," containing another article by Seifullin, "On Chuvash National Pedagogy," pp. 234-241.

This appears to be a very valuable little book with some useful studies in it and with considerable information about contemporary literary works. The articles dealing with syntactic and morphological questions all seem to suffer from the great preoccupation with Russian grammatical types that so strongly influences all Soviet linguistic scholars. A greater acquaintance with K. Grønbech's *Der türkische Sprachbau* would produce analyses more indicative of the true nature of the Chuvash sentence.

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John R. Krueger

Nicholas N. Poppe, *Buriat Grammar*. Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series, Vol. 2. Published by Indiana University, Bloomington and Mouton & Co, The Hague, 1960. IX + 129 S. 8°.

Das Burjätische ist eines der wichtigsten mongolischen Idiome, über das bisher nur sehr wenig in westlichen Sprachen publiziert worden ist, während das ziemlich ausgedehnte russische Material weitgehend unzugänglich erscheint. Deshalb stellt Poppes Arbeit die Erfüllung eines Desideratums dar. Als ihr besonderer Vorzug darf angesehen werden, daß sie auch die Satzintonation darstellt. Wichtig ist ferner die genaue phonetische Wiedergabe der russ. Fremdwörter, z. B. *t'arākt'or* > russ. *trāktor*,

tsenzūra < russ. *cen-zu-ra* usw., wo stets russ. betonter Silbe ein Langvokal entspricht, der in der offiziellen sowjetischen Schreibweise vernachlässigt wird (bei Cydendambaev: *Russko-burjat-mongol' skij slovar'*, Moskva 1954: *traktor, cen-zu-ra*), außer in gewissen Fällen, wo man anscheinend die russ. Herkunft des Wortes übersehen hat (so *tôrbo* < russ. *tórba* 'Sack, Beutel', das seinerseits ein Lehnwort < türk. *torba* ~ *tobra*, dieses < pers. *tōbra* ist). Zur Einführung für Anfänger sei Poppes Arbeit aufs wärmste empfohlen.

Wiesbaden

Gerhard Doerfer


American Studies in Uralic Linguistics. Edited by the Indiana University Committee on Uralic Studies (= Vol. I of the *Uralic and Altaic Series*, Editor: Thomas A. Sebeok). Bloomington, 1960, 356 pp. (Also: Mouton and Co., 's-Gravenhage).

The Indiana University Committee on Uralic Studies deserves our praise for having produced this volume, well up to the standard of highest scholarship. It contains twelve articles on Finno-Ugrian linguistics, written by scholars working in the United States. As Indiana University has lately become the leading centre (outside the Mari Republic) of Cheremis studies, it is not surprising to see that five articles deal with Cheremis problems. Four contributions are made to Balto-Finnic studies. By far the longest article in the volume is by Alo Raun on "The equivalents of English 'than' in Finno-Ugric" (pp. 149-247). – A remarkably clear and well-documented treatment of a difficult and interesting problem. Two articles deal with Hungarian. One of them, by Nicholas Poppe, "On some Altaic loanwords in Hungarian" (pp. 139-147) is an appropriate reminder of the many ties that join Uralic to Altaic studies. Poppe's article has already called for some interesting comments by Ligeti, "Néhány megjegyzés úgynevezett altaji jövevényszavainkról", *MNy.*, LVI (1960), 289-303.

We have known for some time of the vigorous new school of Uralic studies brought into being by Thomas A. Sebeok. This volume – of which he is the Editor and to which he contributed an important study on "Eighteenth century Cheremis: the evidence from Pallas" (pp. 289-345) – is a further testimony to the seriousness with which these studies are now pursued in the United States. After such a promising start one can look forward hopefully to the first "Altaic" volume of this new series.

Cambridge

Denis Sinor



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